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Free Speech, Terrorism, and 
European Security: 
Defining and Defending the 
Political Community 
 
Shawn Marie Boyne 
 
“[W]e are seeing an increasing use of what I call the „T-word‟—
terrorism—to demonize political opponents, to throttle freedom 
of speech and the press, and to delegitimize legitimate political 
grievances.”1 
 
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan (2003) 
 
The United States and its European allies are engaged in a 
global struggle against terror.  While world-wide criticism of 
America‘s leadership of the ―war on terror‖ has focused 
attention on America‘s human rights transgressions, the 
United States is not the only democratic state that, at times, 
has privileged national security over civil liberties.  Just as 
images of the burning World Trade Center towers transformed 
America‘s domestic political dynamic and propelled then-
President Bush to declare a war on terror, subsequent terrorist 
attacks in London2 and Madrid3 have raised the stakes, as well 
 
 Shawn Boyne is an Associate Professor of Law at Indiana University 
Law School-Indianapolis.  My gratitude to Marianne Wade, George Wright, 
and Talia Einhorn for their comments on earlier versions of this article. 
Susan Boland and Ravi Deol deserve thanks for their excellent reference 
assistance.  I owe a special thanks to Professor Timothy Waters (Mauer 
School of Law) and Dr. Yilmaz for their last minute Turkish translation 
assistance.  All errors are my own. 
1. Press Release, Security Council, Menace of Terrorism Requires Global 
Response, Says Secretary-General, Stressing Importance of Increased United 
Nations Role, U.N. Doc. SC/7639 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8583.doc.htm. 
2. See Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus Blasts in London Kill at Least 37, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at A1. 
3. See Elaine Sciolino, 10 Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1. 
1
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as the human rights challenges, in Europe. 
Without a doubt, both the March 2004 Madrid train 
bombings and the July 2005 suicide attacks on the London 
transit system noticeably shook European politics and  
reshaped Europe‘s counterterrorism policies, albeit in disparate 
ways.4  Coupled with the assassination of Dutch filmmaker 
Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004,5 the London 
and Madrid bombings strongly impacted European 
consciousness and public opinion, stirring public fears that 
jihadist networks had penetrated Europe.6  In testimony given 
before the United States Senate in June 2007, the Dutch 
Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism testified 
that ―the greatest threat to the Netherlands‖ was Islamic 
radicalism and jihadism.7  In a report released in April 2009, 
the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the 
Netherlands rated the threat posed to the Netherlands by 
terrorism as ―substantial.‖8  In 2007, German Interior Minister 
Wolfgang Schäuble stated that ―[t]here are a lot of concrete 
indications . . . that show that Germany has increasingly 
moved into the crosshairs of international terrorism.‖9  The 
 
4. See Narcisco Michavila, War, Terrorism and Elections: Electoral 
Impact of the Islamist Terror Attacks on Madrid 14, 31 (Real Instituto 
Elcano, Working Paper No. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/186/Michavila186.pdf 
(arguing that the Madrid attacks triggered a backlash against the 
government‘s position on the Iraq War).  See also First Poll on the London 
Bombings, http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/59 (July 9, 2005) 
(arguing that public support for government policies that restrict civil 
liberties rose after the attack). 
5. See Marlise Simons, Dutch Filmmaker, An Islamic Critic, Is Killed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at A5. 
6. See generally Robert S. Leiken, Europe‟s Angry Muslims, 81 FOREIGN 
AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at 120. 
7. ANDREA NAPHEGYI & ANTONIYA STOYANOVA, NETH. HELSINKI COMM., 
ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 69 (Peter Morris trans., 2007), available at 
http://www2.nhc.nl/spaw2/uploads/files/anrep2007.pdf. 
8. Letter from the Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding 
[National Coordinator for Counterterrorism] to the Chairperson of the Lower 
House of the States General (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://english.nctb.nl/ 
(search ―Summary DTN 2009‖; follow second search result ―Summary DTN‖ 
hyperlink).  According to the report, this means that there is a reasonable 
possibility that an attack will occur against Dutch interests at home or 
abroad.  Id. at 2.  The reasons listed in the report for placing the Netherlands 
on the target list is the presence of Dutch military personnel in Afghanistan 
as well as the perceived insult to Islam that exists in the Netherlands.  Id. 
9. Germany Worried About Increased Terrorism Threat, 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/17
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United States cannot afford to ignore these developments as 
recent intelligence reports suggest that terrorist networks in 
Europe pose a serious threat, not only to Europe, but to the 
United States as well.10 
The emergence of this ―new‖ heightened threat prompted 
European governments to institute a new round of security 
measures.  In most cases, however, the ―new‖ counterterrorism 
legislation merely revised and extended existing policies.11  As 
a result, Europe‘s response to the 2004 and 2005 attacks should 
be seen as part of a process that did not start with initial 
attacks on European soil, nor with the 9/11 attacks in 2001.  
The context and timing of Europe‘s response elucidates another 
key point.  No ―monolithic‖ European response to terrorism 
exists.  Instead, Council of Europe member states have adopted 
a common framework approach to terrorism that 
accommodates differences in states‘ legal and political cultures.  
To some extent the current counterterrorism policies in place in 
Europe reflect each state‘s unique prior record to responding to 
domestic terrorism.12  Despite the fact that European states are 
 
DEUTSCHEWELLE.COM, July 23, 2007 (F.R.G.), http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,2702203,00.html. 
10. Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community: Hearing 
before the S. Select Comm. on Intel., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of 
Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence), available at 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf.  See also US Concerned About 
Possible Terrorist Threat From Europe, VOANEWS.COM, Jan. 16, 2008, 
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-01/2008-01-16-
voa45.cfm?CFID=259075030&CFTOKEN=98948008&jsessionid=de30bcb440
df9e7f092037467878f2c5b474 (statement by United States Homeland 
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff stating that Western Europe could 
become a breeding ground for terrorists). 
11. See discussion infra Part II(C). 
12. In the past four decades, many of Europe‘s largest states acquired 
considerable experience confronting the challenge posed by domestic 
terrorists.  While the United Kingdom leads the list with its nine-decade 
battle with the Irish Republican Army, the criminal codes of France (Corsican 
nationalists), Spain (Basque Separatists), and Germany (RAF) all carry the 
imprimatur of these prior responses to terrorism.  The complete list of 
international and supranational conventions that relate to terrorism are too 
long to include here.  The major conventions include: U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1373 of 2001, S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 
2001); U.N. Security Council Resolution 1624 of 2005, S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005); the Council Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism (EU) No. 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 
164) 3 [hereinafter Council Framework Decision 2002]; the Council 
Framework Decision Amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
3
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signatories to international and supranational terrorism 
conventions, those conventions have been ―translated‖ into 
domestic legal regimes in unique ways. 
Faced with a rich vein of research topics concerning the 
legality of the United States‘ counterterrorism policies, 
American legal scholars have largely ceded critical analysis of 
European policies to European scholars and human rights 
groups.13  While European government officials have joined 
with the media in criticizing human rights violations 
committed by the American government in Iraq and 
Guantanamo, this chorus of criticism has largely obscured 
publicity concerning the potential human rights pitfalls of 
Europe‘s own counterterrorism policies.14  To be sure, the broad 
scope, reach, and nature of the United States‘ counterterrorism 
policy and its decision to invade Iraq have offered critics of 
American policy a hefty target.  Moreover, because the United 
States is a superpower, any misstep provides fodder for critics 
who choose to frame their critique as part of a larger discourse 
against American hegemony.15  Largely obscured behind the 
dark cloud of America‘s perceived human rights transgressions, 
and ongoing struggle to exit Iraq, is the extent to which 
 
Combating Terrorism (EU) No. 2008/919/JHA of 28 Nov. 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 
330) 21 [hereinafter Council Framework Amendment 2008]; and the Council 
of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. 
196. 
13. Some notable exceptions, however, exist.  See Laura K. Donohue, 
Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 233 
(2005); Martha Minow, Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 453 (2007) (assessing the governments‘ simultaneous overreactions and 
underreactions to the threats posed by terrorism); Ellen Parker, Comment, 
Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act 2006—The Relationship Between 
Counterterrorism Law, Free Speech, and the Muslim Community in the 
United Kingdom Versus the United States, 21 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 711 (2007) 
(arguing that the United Kingdom has gone further to restrict civil liberties 
in the area of free speech). 
14. Politicians throughout Europe have criticized U.S. policy regarding 
the Iraq War, the treatment of detainees, and the use of torture.  See, e.g., 
Raymond Bonner & Jane Perlez, British Report Criticizes U.S. Treatment of 
Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at A6; Chirac Questions U.S.-Led 
Iraq War, BBCNEWS.COM, Nov. 17, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4018325.stm; German Chancellor 
Criticizes U.S.‟s Guantanamo Facility, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, 
Jan. 7, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1064501.html. 
15. See, e.g., Alison Brysk, Human Rights and National Insecurity, in 
NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES DEBATE 
COUNTERTERRORISM 1, 7 (Alison Brysk & Gerson Shafir eds., 2007). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/17
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European governments have followed the United States‘ lead in 
privileging national security concerns at the expense of civil 
liberties.16  In particular, the Council of Europe Convention on 
Prevention of Terrorism was the first international instrument 
that called for the enactment of penal code provisions 
criminalizing the offense of incitement to terrorism.17  The 
Convention‘s public provocation offense extends both to direct, 
as well as indirect, incitement to terrorism.18 
Perhaps nowhere is this development so evident as in the 
area of free speech.19  Throughout Europe, states have enacted 
anti-incitement and public disorder laws that grant states 
broad authority to prohibit and punish speech that may have 
highly attenuated links to terrorist activity.20  A key example of 
 
16. One exception to this statement is the widespread criticism of 
European complicity in the CIA‘s rendition program.  See AMNESTY INT‘L, 
STATE OF DENIAL: EUROPE‘S ROLE IN RENDITION AND SECRET DETENTION (2008), 
available at  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/003/2008/en/2ceda343-41da-
11dd-81f0-01ab12260738/eur010032008eng.pdf (documenting and criticizing 
the participation of several European states in the CIA‘s controversial 
rendition program).  See also Resolution on the Alleged Use of European 
Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of 
Prisoners, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032, ¶ 190 (2007), available 
at www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/tempcom/tdip/final_ep_resolution_en.pdf 
(stating that ―all European countries that have not done so should initiate 
independent investigations into all stopovers made by civilian aircraft carried 
out by the CIA, at least since 2001‖). 
17. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, supra 
note 12, at art. 5, ¶ 2.  See also ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR. ET AL., 
EXPERT WORKSHOP ON PREVENTING TERRORISM: FIGHTING INCITEMENT AND 
TERRORIST RELATED ACTIVITIES 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.libforall.org/OSCE%20Preventing%20Terrorism.pdf. 
18. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, supra 
note 12, at art. 5, ¶ 1. 
19. One exception to this statement is the widespread criticism of 
European complicity in the CIA‘s rendition program.  See AMNESTY INT‘L, 
supra note 16 (documenting and criticizing the participation of several 
European states in the CIA‘s controversial rendition program).  See also 
Resolution on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the 
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, supra note 16. 
20. For example, in 2003, Belgium amended its criminal code to include 
the crime of incitement.  The provision states: 
 
Any person who, either by views expressed in meetings or 
public places or by writings, printed matter, images or 
emblems of any kind displayed, distributed, sold or put on 
sale or public view, directly provoked others to commit the 
crime or offence, without prejudice to the penalties imposed 
5
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the erosion of free speech occurring throughout Europe is the 
European Court of Human Rights‘s October 2008 decision in 
Leroy v. France.21  In that case, the Court upheld the French 
conviction of a cartoonist who had penned and published a 
cartoon that linked the 9/11 attacks with America‘s decline.22  
Leroy, which will be discussed later in this article,23 is just one 
example of several cases that demonstrate that legislators and 
judges on the other side of the Atlantic have opened the door to 
the broad regulation of speech.  They have done so by enacting 
vaguely-worded legislation that grants prosecutors wide 
discretion in applying and enforcing the law.  This trend 
towards criminalizing broader categories of speech raises the 
question as to whether measures taken by democratic 
governments to restrict speech in the name of preventing 
Islamic radicalization will undermine or strengthen the 
European models of democratic governance. 
With the change in Administration in Washington, D.C., 
there has, at minimum, been a shift in tone, if not yet in 
substance, of American foreign policy.24  Given the close 
strategic cooperation between the United States and Europe in 
counterterrorism policy, the time is apt for a deeper 
examination of the extent to which the anti-terrorism policies 
adopted in Europe challenge a foundational principle of liberal 
 
by law on authors of provocations to commit crimes or 
offences, even if such provocations were not acted upon. 
 
CODE PÉNAL [Penal Code] art. 66 (Belg.).  See also DAVID BANISAR, SPEAKING 
OF TERROR: A SURVEY OF THE EFFECTS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION ON 
FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN EUROPE 20 (2008), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/SpeakingOfTerror_en.pd
f (discussing the Belgian Code in English). 
21. Leroy c. France [Leroy v. France], App. No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2008), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=ht
ml&highlight=leroy%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20france%20%7C%2036109/03&
sessionid=41876423&skin=hudoc-en (upholding Dennis Leroy‘s conviction for 
complicity in condoning terrorism). 
22. Id. 
23. See discussion infra notes 244-55. 
24. See, e.g., The White House, Foreign Policy, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign_policy/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) 
(stating that the President has ordered the closure of the Guantanamo Prison 
and prohibited the use of torture). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/17
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democratic governance—namely, the right to free speech.25  It 
is important to acknowledge that the threat posed by terrorism 
is not a new challenge for democratic societies and that prior 
responses to terrorism crafted by some democratic states have 
damaged the rule of law.26  One of the questions that this 
article seeks to address is whether the current threat posed by 
terrorists in Europe represents a categorically new type of 
security threat that may justify more serious intrusions on civil 
liberties: in the province of free speech, does the danger posed 
by calls to violent jihad by Islamic extremists within Europe 
represent such a serious threat to European security that 
justifies restrictions on speech? 
On a cursory level, the fact that anti-terrorism legislation 
in Europe threatens to infringe on free speech is not surprising.  
In contrast to Europe, the United States‘ free speech 
jurisprudence is the most robust in the world.27  During the 
past forty years, Supreme Court decisions have widened the 
ambit of free speech protections and elevated the level of 
protection afforded to political speech.28  Critically, the state 
cannot restrict free speech on the basis of content unless the 
 
25. See generally Marin R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech 
Rationales After September 11th: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade 
Center America, 13 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 185 (2002) (discussing how 
counterterrorism legislation in the United States infringes on free speech). 
26. See, e.g., Shawn Boyne, Law, Terrorism, and Social Movements: The 
Tension Between Politics and Security in Germany‟s Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation, 12 CARDOZO J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 41 (2004).  See also generally 
David R. Lowry, Draconian Powers: The New British Approach to Pretrial 
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 8 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., Fall-Winter 
1976-1977, at 185 (discussing the problems in guerilla warfare and urban 
terrorism that challenge law enforcement in democratic states); Lynn 
Wartchow, Civil and Human Rights Violations in Northern Ireland: Effects 
and Shortcomings of the Good Friday Agreement in Guaranteeing Protections, 
3 NW. U. J. INT‘L HUM. RTS. 1 (2005) (arguing that Northern Ireland‘s political 
structure perpetuated a structure that tolerated the state‘s human rights 
abuses). 
27. See, e.g., The Tongue Twisters, ECONOMIST (London), Oct. 13, 2007, at 
80. 
28. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (upholding flag 
burning as a means of political protest despite potential offensiveness); 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that an individual cannot be 
criminally punished for wearing an offensive article of clothing that criticized 
the draft); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the 
state may not regulate expression that advocates the use of force or the 
violation of law unless the advocacy ―is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action‖). 
7
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government regulation clears the rigorous strict scrutiny 
standard.29  Attempts to restrict the content of core protected 
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a ―compelling state 
interest.‖30  The stringent protections afforded to free speech in 
the United States stem from the ―preferred position‖ that free 
speech enjoys among individual rights in the United States 
Constitution.31  According to the liberal vision of the state, the 
government‘s role is to protect individual rights by keeping the 
public sphere relatively free of government regulation.32  As 
Adrian Oldfield has written: 
 
The function of the political realm is to 
render service to individual interests and 
purposes, to protect citizens in the exercise of 
their rights, and to leave them unhindered in the 
pursuit of whatever individual and collective 
interests and purposes they might have.  
Political arrangements are thus seen in 
utilitarian terms.  To the extent that they afford 
the required protection for citizens and groups to 
exercise their rights and pursue their purposes, 
then citizens have little to do politically beyond 
choose who their leaders are to be.33 
 
In contrast, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(―ECHR‖), which sets the broad framework for human rights 
protections in Europe, tempers the protection afforded to free 
 
29. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 
655 (1990); Sable Commc‘ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Bd. of 
Airport Comm‘rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1987); 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); 
Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); 
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
30. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring 
and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2417 (1996).  See 
also, e.g., supra note 29 and cases cited therein. 
31. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). 
32. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Militating Democracy: Comparative 
Constitutional Perspectives, 29 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 49, 52 (2007) (discussing 
different free speech regimes in the United States and in Europe). 
33. Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism 
and the Modern World, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 75, 76 (Gershon Shamir 
ed., 1998). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/17
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speech with the governmental necessity of imposing 
restrictions ―in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, [or] for the prevention of disorder or 
crime.‖34  This approach privileges the state‘s interests in 
preserving order and protects communitarian values such as 
preventing social unrest and promoting inclusiveness.35  These 
broad differences between the orientation of individual and 
collective rights in Europe and the United States have been 
well-documented.36  What is surprising is the extent to which 
Europe‘s leading democratic states have significantly 
circumscribed the right to free expression as part of a broader 
counterterrorism strategy.37 
While scholars have extensively documented the tension 
that exists between national security and civil liberties, this 
article focuses specifically on penal code provisions designed to 
target individuals who encourage others to commit terrorist 
acts by inciting or glorifying terrorism.  Section I lays out the 
nature of the threat that radical speech poses to democratic 
states as well as the difficulties inherent in crafting legislation 
that does not over-broadly target radical speech.  Section II 
outlines the efforts taken at the European Community and 
Member State levels to criminalize speech that glorifies or 
tends to incite terrorism.  I demonstrate that the prominent 
role that the concept of human dignity plays in European 
jurisprudence at both the supranational and national levels 
 
34. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 10, ¶ 2, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.  Article 10 broadly 
protects free speech and defines it as the right to ―hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.‖  Id. art. 10, ¶ 1.  This right is tempered 
by the fact that the ECHR grants member states the power to impose 
restrictions that ―are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, [or] for the prevention 
of disorder or crime.‖  Id. art. 10, ¶ 2.  In addition, Article 17 of the ECHR 
denies citizens the ―right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed 
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.‖  Id. art. 
17. 
35. Teitel, supra note 32, at 52. 
36. See, e.g., Jochen Abr. Frowein, Incitement Against Democracy as a 
Limitation of Free Speech, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST 
DEMOCRACY 33, 34-38 (David Kretzmer & Francine Kershman Hazan eds., 
2000). 
37. See generally BANISAR, supra note 20 (detailing a broad range of new 
restrictions on the media). 
9
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helps to explain the ease with which European states have so 
quickly moved to restrict speech to counter perceived terrorist 
threats.  I argue that a key reason why some European states 
are moving closer to over-regulating free speech is that the 
political culture has never endorsed an absolutist vision of free 
speech.  Section III draws on case decisions to prove my thesis.  
Moreover, I suggest that legislation that has been designed to 
curb radicalization by curtailing speech expands prosecutorial 
discretion to a degree that is unwarranted by the legislation‘s 
efficacy in fighting terrorism.  Section IV concludes this article 
by asking whether or not the law is the appropriate tool to 
disrupt the radicalization process that drives individuals to join 
the Islamic jihad and suggesting directions for future 
scholarship. 
There is extensive literature regarding the threat to free 
speech rights posed by the Government‘s response to terrorism 
in the United States.38  Unsurprisingly, the literature that 
addresses the right to free speech often ignores developments 
on the European continent.  Examining the free speech policies 
of European states can provide insights into the benefits and 
disadvantages that alternative approaches to regulating free 
speech may offer governments as they confront the dangers 
posed by Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.  Moreover, this 
article aims to contribute to the common interest that the 
United States and Europe share in preserving the rule of law 
and in curbing the state‘s ability to implement law in a 
discriminatory manner.  By exploring the responses to 
terrorism taken by European states, it is possible to revisit the 
advantages and disadvantages of our own policies and 
illuminate our understanding of the forces that drive terrorism 
policy. 
 
I.  When Speech Threatens: Looking at Terrorism-Related 
Speech in Europe 
 
Europe today faces an ongoing and active threat from 
terrorist groups that perhaps exceeds the threat faced by the 
 
38. See generally, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE 
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM (2004); Donohue, supra note 13; Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: 
When is it ―McCarthyism‖? When is it Proper?, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (2005). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/17
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United States.39  In 2008, 515 terrorist attacks were carried out 
in European Union member states.40  During that same period, 
law enforcement officers arrested over one thousand 
individuals for terrorism-related activities.41  According to the 
European Police Agency (EUROPOL), law enforcement charged 
the bulk of the individuals arrested with the offense of 
suspicion of membership in a terrorist organization.42  The 
remainder of the arrests included attack-related offenses, 
fomenting propaganda, and providing support to terrorists.43  
Despite the publicity given to al-Qaeda in the United States, 
the bulk of these attacks were committed by non-Islamic 
separatist groups in France and Spain.44  However, only one 
attack in 2008, in which a United Kingdom national detonated 
a bomb in England, can be attributed to Islamic terrorism.45  
This dearth of attacks by Islamic extremists does not mean 
that intelligence experts should remove Europe from the list of 
states targeted by Islamic extremists.  The fact that European 
officials have arrested scores of individuals on charges related 
to planning actions undertaken in Belgium, France, Spain, and 
other countries demonstrates that Europe still faces an active 
threat.46 
There are myriad reasons why radical Islamic terrorist 
groups have targeted Europe.  A key cause has been the 
emergence of home-grown terrorist cells within Europe.  While 
 
39. Anil Dawar, Barack Obama Warns Europe Faces Greater Threat 
From al-Qaeda, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Apr. 3, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/03/obama-russia-nato-al-qaida 
(stating that President Obama believes that it is more likely that al-Qaeda 
could launch a serious terrorist attack in Europe than in the United States). 
40. EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2009: EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND 
REPORT § 4.1 (2009), available at 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Tre
nd_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2009.pdf. 
41. Id. § 4.2.  Approximately fifty percent (501 out of 1009) of the 
suspects arrested were associated with a separatist organization.  
Government officials identified 187 individuals as linked to Islamist 
extremism.  The remainder of the arrestees fell into the categories of left 
wing extremism, single issue extremism, or unspecified causes.  Id. 
42. Id. § 4.3. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. § 4.1 (explaining that there were 137 attacks committed in 
France and 253 committed in Spain). 
45. Id. § 5. 
46. Id. 
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al-Qaeda posed an external threat to Europe at the time of the 
9/11 attacks,47 ―proselytizing . . . by radical preachers‖ within 
Europe has fuelled the emergence of home-grown groups 
capable of carrying out attacks on European soil.48  Although it 
has become convenient to designate al-Qaeda as the prime 
suspect whenever a terrorist attack occurs, al-Qaeda is not a 
vast monolithic organization.  Instead, it is a brand name used 
by a loosely connected network of groups that subscribe to the 
ideology of jihadism.49 
Radical preachers, who propagate the doctrine of radical 
Salafist Islam, play a key role in spreading the message of 
jihad.50  The preachers and the message they espouse pose a 
critical threat to Europe‘s democratic governments.  With the 
financial support of the Saudi government, there has been an 
unprecedented increase in the number of Wahhabi/neo-Salifi 
mosques built in Western Europe and the United States in the 
last three decades.51  This support has transformed a religion 
with primarily local support to a doctrine with global reach.  
This reach expanded significantly when Saudi Arabia elected to 
support American policy during the first Gulf War by allowing 
 
47. While several of the participants in the 9/11 attacks resided in 
Hamburg, Germany prior to the attacks, they were not citizens of any 
European country.  See TERRY MCDERMOTT, PERFECT SOLDIERS: THE 
HIJACKERS: WHO THEY WERE, WHY THEY DID IT, at xi-xii (2005). 
48. Juan José Escobar Stemmann, Middle East Salafism‟s Influence and 
the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe, MID. E. REV. INT‘L AFF., 
Sept. 2006, at 1, 1, available at 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/Escobar.pdf. 
49. See JASON BURKE, AL-QAEDA: CASTING A SHADOW OF TERROR 16-17 
(2003). 
50. The followers of radical or neo-Salafism Islam are an offshoot of the 
Salafi movement.  That movement rejects ―modern‖ interpretations of Islamic 
texts and interprets ―modern‖ to mean any text not authored by scholars who 
were part of the first two generations of scholars who immediately followed 
the prophet Mohammed.  See Escobar Stemmann, supra note 48, at 1.  As 
fundamentalist believers, adherents of this strain of Islam reject more 
contemporary interpretations of the Koran.  See Benjamin E. Schwartz, 
America‟s Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement, 51 ORBIS 107, 
112-13 (2007).  More specifically, proponents of Salafism desire to practice 
Islam exactly as it was revealed by the Prophet and they reject subsequent 
interpretations of Islam authored by Islamic jurists.  See Lee Smith, Jihad 
Without End, SLATE.COM, Mar. 18, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2097370. 
51. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 113.  Motivating the Saudi actions 
was a desire to counter the ideological vision advanced by Iran‘s Islamic 
revolution and new theocratic government beginning in 1979.  Id. at 114. 
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American troops to be stationed on Saudi soil.  This decision 
fueled the more extremist Salafi scholars to prosteletize a more 
politicized theology52 that questioned the legitimacy of the 
Saudi government and called for a jihad.53  Ironically, while 
Saudi Arabia‘s efforts to spread Wahhabism hampered the 
spread of Iran‘s influence, the institutional network created to 
foster that spread was susceptible to cooptation by more 
extremist elements. 
Although moderate followers of Salafism recognize the 
authority of the Saudi clergy and royal family, radical Salafists 
propagate a clear, theological vision of Islam that aims to 
impose a global Islamic caliphate.54  Accordingly, radical Salafi 
preachers do not acknowledge the authority of secular political 
figures, nor do they accept the concept of a nation-state.55  
Their goal of a supranational political religious community 
casts a hostile eye on Europe‘s political and intellectual 
pluralism.56  Because this theocratic political doctrine views the 
concept of political and intellectual pluralism with hostility, it 
challenges Europe‘s multi-cultural goal of promoting religious 
tolerance.  Indeed, the doctrine of Salafi jihad promoted by 
radical Salafists aims to counter Europe itself and to establish 
an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.57 
In this religious ―war,‖ radical imams function as front line 
officers.  This strategy was echoed by Dr. al-Qaradawi on the 
Arabic radio station, al-Jazeera: ―Islam will return to Europe.  
The conquest need not necessarily be by sword.  Perhaps we 
will conquer these lands without armies.  We want an army of 
preachers and teachers who will present Islam in all languages 
 
52. See id. at 116 (stating that the United States‘ actions to defend Saudi 
Arabia and Saudi Arabia‘s rejection of al-Qaeda‘s offer of assistance made the 
United States an al-Qaeda target). 
53. See Escobar Stemmann, supra note 48, at 3.  Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi published a book in 1991 entitled Proof of the Infidelity of the Saudi 
State.  According to Escobar Stemmann, Abdallah Azzam‘s treatise, entitled 
The Main Obligation of Muslims is to Defend the Land of Islam, has helped to 
shape Usama bin Laden‘s views.  Id. at 4. 
54. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 111-15. 
55. See Escobar Stemmann, supra note 48, at 3. 
56. Id. 
57. See Shmuel Bar, The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism: What 
the Fatwas Say, POL‘Y REV., June-July 2004, at 27,  29-30.  See also Schwartz, 
supra note 50, at 111. 
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and all dialects.‖58 
During the past decade, the presence of this army of 
preachers and teachers on European soil has facilitated the 
spread of the radical jihadist message to disaffected Muslims 
within Europe.  Although not all mosques in Europe have been 
co-opted by the message of radical Salafism, estimates of the 
degree of ―penetration‖ are discouraging.  A 2007 study by the 
London Times found that almost half of Britain‘s 1,350 
mosques are under the control of a hard-line sect whose leading 
preacher ―has called on Muslims to ‗shed blood‘ for Allah.‖59  
Given that the ideology of jihad has spread into mosques, 
prisons, and social networks throughout Europe, the 
appearance of home-grown terrorists in Europe is 
unsurprising.  In fact, by 2002, the Danish intelligence service 
reported that radical Muslims who had been born and raised in 
Europe ―were beginning to regard Europe as a frontline for 
Jihad.‖60  By 2003, that same intelligence agency noted that 
grassroots radicalization was gaining ground in Europe.61  The 
problem has only worsened.  In the two-year span between 
2002 and 2004, intelligence agencies throughout Europe began 
to shift their focus away from the external threat represented 
by al-Qaeda to the potential threat posed by home-grown 
terrorists.62 
 
58. Kristin Baker, James Mitchell, & Brian Tindall, Combating Islamist 
Terrorism in Europe, AM. DIPLOMACY, Nov. 13, 2007, 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/1012/bake/bakeretal_islameuro
pe.html (citing Anthony Browne, The Triumph of the East, SPECTATOR.CO.UK, 
July 24, 2004, http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/12424/the-triumph-of-
the-east.thtml (quoting imam Dr. Al-Quaradawi, Sharia and Life (al-Jazeera 
television broadcast 1999), translated by the Middle East Media Research 
Institute)). 
59. Melanie Phillips, Denial, England: Have We Learned Nothing?, 
NAT‘L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 11, 2007, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=M2I4ZTIzNGY1ZjkzYjU4ZjU5NjA3NTQ
4MjBlNTk3NWQ=. 
60. TOMAS PRECHT, DANISH MINTR‘Y OF JUST., HOME GROWN TERRORISM 
AND ISLAMIST RADICALISATION IN EUROPE: FROM CONVERSION TO TERRORISM 18 
(2007), available at 
http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokume
ntation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-
_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf. 
61. Id. 
62. In 2004, the British Joint Intelligence Committee reported that the 
United Kingdom would face an ongoing threat from domestic terrorism over 
the next five years.  See id.  Germany‘s Ministry of the Interior published a 
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At its core, the battle being waged by radical Islamists is 
not merely an attempt to challenge Europe‘s secular 
governments, but is also an effort by the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi 
movement to impose its political vision on all followers of 
Islam.63  To this end, jihadist organizers aim to expand the 
reach of the radical Salafist message throughout Europe.  In 
2005, writing in Foreign Affairs, Robert S. Leiken noted: 
 
Jihadist networks span Europe from Poland 
to Portugal, thanks to the spread of radical Islam 
among the descendants of guest workers once 
recruited to shore up Europe‘s postwar economic 
miracle.  In smoky coffeehouses in Rotterdam 
and Copenhagen, makeshift prayer halls in 
Hamburg and Brussels, Islamic bookstalls in 
Birmingham and ―Londonistan,‖ and the prisons 
of Madrid, Milan, and Marseilles, immigrants or 
their descendants are volunteering for jihad 
against the West.64 
 
To explain why the message of radical Islam has taken 
root in Europe, some scholars point to underlying societal 
tensions that have been several decades long in development.65 
Despite the fact that European governments and businesses 
opened the door to an influx of guest workers after World War 
II, many European citizens viewed those invitations as 
temporary in nature.66  Although many first-generation 
Muslim immigrants have long since satisfied formalistic 
criteria for earning European citizenship, in the eyes of those 
Europeans who do not embrace the vision of a multi-cultural 
 
report in 2004 that estimated that there were 31,800 ―members and 
followers‖ of Islamist organizations and 57,000 ―potentially extremist 
foreigners in Germany.‖  See Kathleen Ridolfo, Europe: Growing Base for Al-
Qaeda?, TERRORISME.NET, July 7, 2005, 
http://www.terrorisme.net/p/article_164.shtml (internal citation omitted). 
63. See generally Leiken, supra note 6. 
64. Id. at 124 (arguing that the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi movement aims to 
impose its political vision on all followers of Islam including traditional 
Sunnis, Shiites, secular Kurds, and all other followers). 
65. Jocelyne Cesari, Islam, Secularism and Multiculturalism After 9/11: 
A Transatlantic Comparison, in EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE SECULAR STATE 
39, 43-44 (Jocelyne Cesari & Seán McLoughlin eds., 2005). 
66. Leiken, supra note 6, at 121-22. 
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Europe, Muslims have not—and perhaps cannot—satisfy 
unstated cultural criteria.  As a result, for many Muslims 
living in Europe today, citizenship is a hollow shell that does 
not extend to social, cultural, and political realms.  Although 
Muslim leaders in Europe have become increasingly engaged 
with the State and civil society, many European citizens 
continue to view Muslim claims for public recognition as 
threats to European culture and society.67 
Thus, in addition to their deep-seated religious faith, 
Europe‘s home-grown terrorists share a sense of alienation 
from European society as well as a hatred of Western culture.68  
In large part, this alienation can be tied to the stagnant social 
and economic position and high unemployment of many 
Muslim immigrants.69  Many remain trapped in menial jobs 
with little chance of advancement.70  In contrast to the United 
States where Muslim immigrants have largely integrated 
themselves within America‘s diverse society, many second and 
third generation Muslim ―immigrants‖ in Europe reside in 
largely poor, separate geographic communities that are 
ethnically and religiously homogeneous.71  These separate 
communities are a natural recruitment ground for radical 
Islamists.72 
There is yet an additional political component to the 
radicalization problem.  Many Europeans have come to reject 
the multi-cultural vision advanced by elite-level policy-
makers.73  Throughout Europe, attitudes towards Muslim 
citizens hardened after the 9/11 attacks.74  Some opinion 
 
67. Jocelyne Cesari, Introduction, in EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE 
SECULAR STATE, supra note 65, at 1, 4. 
68. PRECHT, supra note 60, at 9. 
69. Id. at 44. 
70. Id.; David Rieff, An Islamic Alienation, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 14, 
2005, at 11, 11. 
71. See Posting of Perrspective, Homegrown Terrorism in the U.S. and 
Europe, http://www.perrspectives.com/blog/archives/000451.htm (Aug. 13, 
2006, 12:40 EST). 
72. Leiken, supra note 6, at 123. 
73. Id. at 123. 
74. See, e.g., Olof Åslund & Dan-Olof Rooth, Shifts in Attitudes and 
Labor Market Discrimination: Swedish Experiences After 9-11, 18 J. 
POPULATION ECON. 603, 605-07 (2005) (suggesting that Swedish attitudes 
towards immigrants may have created a lasting shift in negative attitudes 
towards immigrants). 
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leaders have felt increasingly less constrained in promoting 
platforms that would curtail immigration.75 
Although these socio-political factors help to create 
favorable conditions that may spur some disaffected 
individuals to turn to violence, there is no single path to 
becoming a violent extremist.76  Unfortunately, many 
democratic states have constructed anti-radicalization policies 
based on the premise that such a singular path exists.  Many 
states‘ counterterrorism policies are based on the premise that 
the path to becoming a terrorist begins with the individual‘s 
embrace of conservative Salafi interpretations of the Koran.77  
Accordingly, governments such as the United Kingdom have 
implemented policies that aim to suppress the spread of the 
conservative Salafi message.78  While some members of the 
counterterrorism community celebrate this proactive approach, 
there are significant problems with these ―counter-
radicalization‖ programs.  As Dr. Jeffrey Stevenson Murer 
points out: 
 
One of the most significant problems with 
most of the European ‗counter-radicalisation‘ 
programmes, . . . is the frequent 
conceptualisation of radicalisation as a singular 
position, within a singular community, leading 
toward a singular trajectory.  Explicitly this 
translates as a road toward ‗terrorist violence‘, 
which begins with the adoption of conservative 
Salafi interpretations of the Koran within the—
again singularly conceived—Muslim community, 
which may lead to involvement in suicide 
bombings.79 
 
 
75. See Terri E. Givens, Immigrant Integration in Europe: Empirical 
Research, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 67, 68, 75-76 (2007). 
76. Jeffrey Stevenson Murer, Radical Citizenship, 19 PUB. SERVICE REV.: 
HOME AFF. 42, 42 (2009) (internal citation omitted). 
77. See id. 
78. See, e.g., U.K. to Shift Anti-Terror Strategy, BBCNEWS.COM, Feb. 16, 
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7889631.stm (stating that the 
United Kingdom would now target violent extremists who voice disapproval 
of democracy and state institutions). 
79. See Stevenson Murer, supra note 76, at 42. 
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If it is true that individuals become radicalized in a variety 
of ways, counterterrorism strategies premised on a singular 
path to radicalization rest on faulty empirical assumptions.80  If 
radicalization is indeed a dynamic process that includes both 
individual-specific and macro-level factors, then governments 
that prosecute radical speech risk implementing overbroad 
prohibitions that will undermine democratic debate without 
seriously disrupting the radicalization process.81  This fact 
creates a problem for policy-makers.  As evidence suggests that 
the radicalization process is occurring more widely and 
anonymously in the internet age,82 it has become more difficult 
to target groups of individuals participating in that process.  
Although radical mosques have played a key role in 
recruitment efforts in the past, that role is now declining as 
Islamic recruitment efforts have been driven underground.83  
Moreover, despite the abundance of scholarship and conjecture 
that points to religious doctrine as being the wellspring of 
inspiration for terrorist violence in Europe today, a 2009 study 
published by the United Kingdom‘s counter-intelligence and 
national security agency, MI5, discovered that individuals who 
are more likely to engage in violence are typically not religious 
zealots.84 
An additional consideration that complicates 
counterterrorism policy is the fact that mere exposure to 
extremist ideology will not, by itself, lead an individual to 
adopt radical beliefs.  In fact, data collected from hundreds of 
case studies demonstrates that ―no one becom[es] a terrorist 
 
80. In this context, I have adopted Precht‘s definition of radicalization, 
which defines it as ―a process of adopting an extremist belief system and the 
willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence and fear, as a method of 
effecting changes in society.‖  PRECHT, supra note 60, at 16. 
81. See Edwin Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe and Global Salafi 
Jihadis, in JIHADI TERRORISM AND THE RADICALISATION CHALLENGE IN EUROPE 
69, 79-84 (Rik Coolsaet ed., 2008); PRECHT, supra note 60, at 32-44, 79-81; 
MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP‘T, INTELLIGENCE 
DIV., RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 19 (2007), 
available at 
http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-
Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. 
82. PRECHT, supra note 60, at 6. 
83. EUROPOL, supra note 40, at 19. 
84. See Stevenson Murer, supra note 76, at 42. 
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overnight.‖85  Individuals must come in personal contact with 
other individuals who are members of violent extremist 
networks.86  Indeed a 2008 report released by MI5 goes further, 
stating that ―[w]hat is different about those who ended up 
involved in terrorism is that they came into contact with 
existing extremists who recognised their vulnerabilities (and 
their usefulness to the extremist group).‖87  Once an individual 
joins a group, psychological factors such as the reward of 
belonging, enhanced self-esteem, and a sense of security bind 
the individual to the group.88  While online extremist website 
communities do not, by themselves, radicalize individuals, they 
create opportunities for ―virtual‖ social interaction that may 
precede or supplement benefits received from person-to-person 
contact.89 
Although this research argues in favor of law enforcement 
policies that target recruitment networks, to an increasing 
extent, ―terrorist‖ activity in Europe is taking place outside 
known terrorist networks.  According to a 2008 EUROPOL 
report, law enforcement authorities could not link over two-
thirds of the individuals arrested in Europe on suspicion of 
involvement in Islamic terrorism to affiliations with known 
terrorist groups.90  The elusiveness of terrorist groups in 
Europe has frustrated law enforcement.  While it may be 
difficult to identify and track down terrorist cells, it is easy to 
enact legislation that criminalizes speech that may ―incite‖ 
terrorism.  Unfortunately, the research discussed above 
suggests that that it is unlikely that such legislation will play 
an effective role in deterring terrorism.  Instead, since many 
individuals who listen to ―radicalized‖ messages do not become 
terrorists, legislation that solely targets the messages will over-
broadly curtail speech.  Not only will some of the speech that 
this legislation targets never lead individuals to join terrorist 
 
85. Alan Travis, The Making of an Extremist, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Aug. 20, 
2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 81, at 20, 37.  See also Todd C. Helmus, 
Why and How Some People Become Terrorists, in SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 71, 79-81 (Paul K. Davis 
& Kim Cragin eds., 2009). 
90. EUROPOL, supra note 40, at 19. 
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groups, but the legislation will also catch some individuals in 
its net who never intended to even indirectly incite violence. 
While the grave nature of the threat that radical Islamic 
terrorism poses to Europe may explain European lawmakers‘ 
motivations in criminalizing a broader range of speech, it does 
not explain why such regulations are considered 
constitutionally permissible.  Section II sets forth the 
constitutional framework that protects the right to free speech 
in Europe.  I then show why courts in most cases have 
condoned efforts that have been taken at the European 
Community and Member State levels to criminalize incitement-
related speech. 
 
II.  Targeting Speech in a Time of Terror: Europe‘s 
Constitutional & Legislative Framework 
 
A. European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The right to free speech is a fundamental right common to 
democratic societies.  Although liberal democracies differ in the 
degree of protection that they grant free speech, the right of 
citizens to criticize their own government is an indispensable 
pillar of free societies that distinguishes them from 
authoritarian regimes.  When the degree of constitutional 
protection accorded to free speech in the United States and 
Europe is examined, however, it is apparent that the socio-
political construction of ―free speech‖ doctrine differs 
dramatically.91  The primary point of divergence is that many 
post-war European constitutions, as well as European 
Community instruments, have accorded the concept of human 
dignity prominent constitutional status.92  The profound 
devastation caused by World War II crippled the continent and 
hardened the continent‘s post-war commitment to preserving 
norms of democratic governance.93  In countries such as 
Germany, an essential pillar of that commitment is the 
doctrine of ―militant democracy,‖ which grants governments 
 
91. Georg Nolte, European and US Constitutionalism: Comparing 
Essential Elements, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 9 (Georg 
Nolte ed., 2005). 
92. Id. 
93. See id. 
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the affirmative power to sanction speech aimed at 
overthrowing the democratic order.94  In stark contrast to the 
high value placed on individual liberty in the United States, 
European courts in general place a high value on human 
dignity and grant the state the power to curtail speech that 
harms the dignity of individuals and groups within society.95 
European history has played a crucial constitutive role in 
shaping the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of 
human dignity.  Not only is the principle known as the 
―watermark‖ of the ECHR,96 but it is explicitly recognized in 
the constitutions of Austria,97 Belgium,98 Germany,99 
Finland,100 Estonia,101 Greece,102 Hungary,103 Ireland,104 
Italy,105 Latvia,106 Lithuania,107 Poland,108 Portugal,109 
Slovenia,110 the Slovak Republic,111 and Spain.112  Moreover, 
decisions of the European Court of Justice underscore the fact 
 
94. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the 
First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of 
Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 
1549, 1558 (2004). 
95. See John C. Knechtle, Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in 
the European Union, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 58 (2008). 
96. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 1, Dec. 
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 10 (―Human dignity is inviolable.  It must be 
respected and protected.‖). 
97. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution], art. 4 (Austria). 
98. BELG. CONST. art. 23. 
99. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] 
[Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.). 
100. SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] arts. 1, 7, 19 (Fin.). 
101. EST. CONST. art. 10. 
102. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN] [Constitution] arts. 7, 106 (Greece). 
103. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [Constitution] art. 54 (Hung.). 
104. Ir. CONST. [Constitution], 1937, pmbl., available at 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/Constitution%20of%20
Ireland.pdf. 
105. CONSTITUZIONE [Cost.] [Constitution] arts. 3, 41 (Italy). 
106. SATVERSME [Constitution] art. 95 (Lat.). 
107. LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 21 (Lith). 
108. TEKST KONSTYTUCJI RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [Constitution] 
ogłoszono w Dz.U. 1997, NR 78 poz. 483, pmbl., arts. 30, 41 (Pol.). 
109. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [Constitution] arts. 1, 13, 
26, 59 (Port.). 
110. USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [Constitution] arts. 21, 34 (Slovn.). 
111. Ústava Slovenskej Republiky [Constitution] arts. 12, 19 (Slovk.). 
112. CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] [Constitution] pmbl., arts. 10, 47 (Spain). 
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that human dignity is a general principle of European law.113 
The preeminent role accorded to human dignity is a key 
difference between the construction of free speech rights in the 
United States and Europe.  Although the United States 
Supreme Court has referred to the term ―human dignity‖ in its 
jurisprudence, those references are limited.114  Without a 
doubt, the concept of human dignity is a more robust source of 
rights protections in European constitutional jurisprudence 
than in the United States.115  The level of constitutional 
protection accorded to human dignity necessarily restricts the 
scope of free speech protections.  Accordingly, under the ECHR, 
free speech is a ―qualified right‖ rather than an ―absolute 
right.‖116  Consequently, it is permissible for a state to restrict 
the right ―if it is necessary in a democratic society to do so and . 
. . there is a legal basis for such limits.‖117 
The value that the European community places on human 
dignity ensures that the right to free speech in some cases may 
be subordinated to the protection of human dignity.  In the 
German hierarchy of constitutional rights, for example, human 
dignity, free development of one‘s personality, and protection of 
personal honor rank higher than free speech in the Basic Law‘s 
hierarchy of values.118  The privileged position that human 
dignity and other values enjoy in the German Basic Law is not 
unique.  The shared history of the Holocaust led many 
European countries to restrict hate speech.119  In fact, one could 
argue that Europe‘s post-war criminalization of hate speech, 
 
113. See, e.g., Case C-377/98, Neth. v. Parliament, 2001 E.C.R. 1-7079 
(upholding German restrictions on the marketing of laser video games on the 
grounds that they violated human dignity). 
114. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the 
execution of individuals with mental retardation violates the Eighth 
Amendment).  See also, e.g., R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts in 
Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 527 (2006) (arguing that the concept of dignity can help 
explain and resolve conflicts between free speech and equal protection). 
115. See Nolte, supra note 91, at 17. 
116. KEIR STARMER, FRANCESCA KLUG, & IAIN BYRNE, BLACKSTONE‘S 
HUMAN RIGHTS DIGEST 2 (2001). 
117. ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR., COUNTERING TERRORISM, 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A MANUAL 67 (2007), available at 
http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2007/11/28294_980_en.pdf. 
118. Krotoszynski, supra note 94, at 1553-54. 
119. Craig S. Smith, Free Speech and Hate Speech: French Ruling Roils 
the Waters, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A6. 
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and the body of judicial decisions upholding those 
proscriptions, explains the ease with which European states 
have so quickly elected to use speech-related prosecutions to 
counter radical Islamic speech.  While it is beyond the scope of 
this article to trace the post-war implementation of hate speech 
legislation to the nation-state level in Europe, in many ways 
the road to the criminalization of terrorism-related speech was 
paved by pre-existing prohibitions on hate speech.120 
To understand the protection that the European 
community affords free speech, we must examine community 
law.  The starting point for understanding the status of laws 
regulating free speech and incitement is the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  The key provisions of the 
ECHR are Articles 10 and 17.  Article 10, which broadly defines 
free speech, states: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression.  [T]his right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. . . . 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it 
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or the rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.121 
 
 
120. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (―ICERD‖), which entered into force in 1969, played a 
profound role in spurring the development of anti-hate speech legislation in 
Europe.  See Knechtle, supra note 95, at 46-48. 
121. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 34, at art. 10, ¶¶ 1-2. 
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Although the ECHR was enacted in 1950, it was not until 
the late 1990s that the European Court of Human Rights 
(―ECtHR‖) articulated a coherent doctrine that weighed state 
safety concerns and the freedom of expression.122  Since that 
date, the ECtHR has developed an analytical framework that it 
applies to alleged Article 10 violations.  In that framework, 
freedom of expression enjoys an inferior status, as it is merely 
a ―qualified right.‖123  Member states may restrict free speech 
when it is ―necessary in a democratic society‖ to further ―the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime.‖124  When 
the ECtHR evaluates alleged Article 10 infringements, it 
begins by determining whether or not the restriction fulfils a 
―pressing social need‖ such as preserving public safety.125 
On its face, Article 10 appears to open the door to 
widespread state restrictions on speech.  The mere presence, 
however, of a ―pressing social need‖ does not justify broad state 
restrictions on speech.  If a particular restriction does fulfil a 
―pressing social need,‖ the ECtHR will next examine whether 
or not the government infringement is both necessary and 
proportionate.126  The ECtHR does not conduct this analysis in 
 
122. Stefan Sottiaux, TERRORISM AND THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS: THE 
ECHR AND THE US CONSTITUTION 88 (2008). 
123. ANDREW LE SEUR, JAVAN HERBERG, & ROSALIND ENGLISH, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC LAW 364 (2d ed. 1999). 
124. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 34, at art. 10, ¶ 2. 
125. See Donohue, supra note 13, at 261-63, 308-310.  States may also 
justify speech restrictions under Article 17 of the Convention.  Article 17 
denies citizens the right to ―engage in any activity or perform any act aimed 
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth . . . in the 
Convention.‖  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 34, at art. 17.  Thus, in addition to the 
power granted under Article 10, states may attempt to invoke Article 17 to 
justify the need for state intervention that circumscribes speech.  Any speech 
that encourages or incites citizens to disrupt the democratic process may not 
enjoy Article 10 protection because the speech transgresses the bounds of 
Article 17. 
126. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 170-71 
(1986) (finding a breach of Article 10 because the government‘s interference 
with the defendant‘s exercise of freedom of expression was not ―necessary in a 
democratic society . . . for the protection of the reputation . . . of others‖ and 
that it was ―disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued‖); Handyside v. 
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 737 (1976) (holding that no 
breach of Article 10 occurred because the government‘s interference with the 
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a hermetic vacuum.  It will examine the surrounding context 
and will consider a state‘s historical circumstances in making 
an assessment of the necessity of state action.127  In several 
decisions, the ECtHR has determined that the context 
surrounding the particular speech ―act‖ reduced or enhanced 
the impact of the speech on national security.128  It has also 
held that states may lawfully derogate from Convention rights 
when necessary to combat the threat posed by terrorism as 
long as restrictions on Convention rights satisfy the 
proportionality requirement.129  By analyzing the link between 
a particular speech act and its potential impact on the 
surrounding socio-political environment, the ECtHR makes an 
implicit calculus of the degree of risk that the speech posed to 
the state.  One can see how the ECtHR conducts this calculus 
in two cases discussed below involving Turkey. 
Turkey‘s ongoing struggle against the Kurdistan Workers‘ 
Party (―PKK‖) and the government‘s multiple attempts to 
restrict speech made on the group‘s behalf have produced a rich 
vein of Article 10 jurisprudence.  As an analytical starting 
point, the ECtHR has, on several occasions, determined and 
reiterated that the PKK poses a security threat to the Turkish 
government.130  This determination, standing alone, has not led 
the ECtHR to sanction all government attempts to proscribe 
political speech.  Instead its rulings have hinged upon a close 
examination of the context and the import of the speech itself.  
The 1997 decision in Zana v. Turkey underscores this point.131  
In that case, the ECtHR upheld Turkey‘s conviction of the 
 
defendant‘s freedom of expression had a legitimate aim and was necessary). 
127. Rekvényi v. Hungary, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 519, 521 (noting that 
Hungary‘s totalitarian history should be considered in weighing the 
constitutionality of restrictions placed on the freedom of expression of police 
officers). 
128. See, e.g., Polat v. Turkey, App. No. 23500/94, at ¶ 47 (1999) (Eur. 
Ct. of H.R.), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=ht
ml&highlight=polat%20%7C%20turkey&sessionid=42559112&skin=hudoc-
en. 
129. See Jeremie J. Wattellier, Note, Comparative Legal Responses to 
Terrorism: Lessons From Europe, 27 HASTINGS INT‗L & COMP. L. REV. 397, 
405–08 (2004) (stating that Art. 5 permits such derogations under certain 
circumstances). 
130. See, e.g., Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, 1997-VII Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 667, 688. 
131. Id. 
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former mayor of Diyarbakir.  While incarcerated in a military 
prison, the ex-mayor made several statements to journalists 
that were later published in a national daily newspaper.  In the 
statements the ex-mayor voiced his support for the PKK‘s 
national liberation movement. 
Although Zana, the former mayor, qualified his remarks by 
stating that he did not support the massacre of women and 
children, a Turkish court convicted him under Articles 168 and 
312 of the Turkish Criminal Code.132  The ECtHR denied 
Zana‘s petition after examining the political and security 
circumstances that existed at the time that the interview was 
published.  Critically, the Court noted that the interview had 
coincided with deadly PKK attacks on civilians in south-east 
Turkey.133  On the basis of that fact, the ECtHR reasoned that 
it was likely that the ex-mayor‘s statements could have 
exacerbated the region‘s already explosive situation.  For that 
reason, the Court concluded that the sanction that Turkey 
imposed on the petitioner could be considered as addressing a 
pressing social need. 
To pass muster under the Court‘s Article 10 analysis, 
however, state action to restrict speech must be both 
proportional and necessary to preserve public safety.  The 
source of the ―necessity‖ standard is the language in Article 10 
that states that a restriction must be ―necessary in a 
democratic society.‖134  Restrictions that are merely desirable 
or reasonable do not satisfy the necessity standard.135  On its 
face, the ―necessary and proportional‖ language used by the 
ECtHR appears to be strikingly similar to the ―narrow 
tailoring‖ requirement of the United States Supreme Court‘s 
strict scrutiny test.136  Similarly, the requirement that 
 
132. See id. at 675 (Article 168 punishes individual membership in an 
armed gang or organization, while Article 312 declares that it is a crime to 
―publicly . . . praise or defend an act punishable by law as a serious crime or 
to urge the people to disobey the law,‖ or to ―publicly . . . incite hatred or 
hostility between the different classes in society, thereby creating 
discrimination based on membership of a social class, race, religion, sect or 
region‖). 
133. Id. at 672. 
134. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 34, at art. 10, ¶ 2. 
135. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 
679 (1976). 
136. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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government interference fulfil a social need on the magnitude 
of public safety seems analogous to the ―compelling government 
interest‖ prong of strict scrutiny.137  Crucially, however, it is 
important to recognize that courts situated in different legal 
cultures may use similar language to express doctrinal tests 
applied differently in practice.138 
In Europe‘s constitutional jurisprudence, government 
restrictions on speech will only satisfy the proportionality 
requirement if two conditions are satisfied.  First, the objective 
of the interference must provide sufficient justification.139  
Second, there must be ―a rational connection between the 
objective and the restriction in question and the means 
employed.‖140  A key component of this analysis is a due process 
notice requirement.  According to that requirement, state 
restrictions on speech must be prescribed by law in advance of 
the government‘s enforcement actions.141  States must set forth 
restrictions on speech in advance of potential violations as well 
as define those restrictions with sufficient precision so that 
citizens may adjust their conduct accordingly.142  As Roger 
Errera points out, these two requirements parallel prohibitions 
in American jurisprudence against overbreadth and 
vagueness.143 
To determine whether or not the government‘s interference 
is necessary, the ECtHR closely examines the nature of the 
audience.  Echoing the decision in Zana v. Turkey, the ECtHR‘s 
evaluation of the legality of government action has turned on 
the specific nature of the audience as well as the timing of the 
speech act.  In decisions that address actions undertaken by 
Turkey, the Court‘s reasoning indicates that the mere fact that 
the PKK is operating in Turkey has not been a sufficient 
 
137. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
138. I owe thanks to George Wright for pointing this out. 
139. Roger Errera, Freedom of Speech in Europe, in EUROPEAN AND US 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 91, at 23, 31.  See also D.J. HARRIS ET AL., 
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 443-44 (2d ed. 2009); 
Nolte, supra note 91, at 9. 
140. STARMER, KLUG, & BYRNE, supra note 116, at 9. 
141. Larissis v. Greece, App. Nos. 23372/94, 26377/94, 26378/94, 1998-I 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 329, 356.  This requirement is consistent with one of the core 
principles of the rule of law-the principle of legality. 
142. See Errera, supra note 139, at 31. 
143. Id. 
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ground, standing alone, that necessitated government 
restriction of speech.  For example, in Incal v. Turkey, the 
ECtHR held that Turkey had overstepped its bounds when it 
convicted an individual for distributing a pamphlet that 
criticized the actions taken by local authority against small-
scale illegal trading and squatters‘ camps.144  In contrast to the 
circumstances surrounding the speech act in Zana, in Incal the 
ECtHR determined that criticism of specific government action, 
which was unrelated to the PKK-incited unrest, was unlikely to 
provoke the population.  The Court stated explicitly that 
nothing in the leaflet could be regarded as incitement to 
violence, hostility, or hatred between citizens.145  In the Court‘s 
eyes, mere criticism of a government that is unlikely to provoke 
a strong public reaction does not justify government 
interference.  In determining the necessity of restrictions 
designed to protect public safety, the ECtHR considers whether 
or not the speech is likely to incite a broad, as opposed to a 
local, reaction.  The Court has tended to discount government 
restrictions on inflammatory speech where that speech is likely 
to reach only a small audience.146  Looking specifically at 
decisions which address incitement-related speech, it appears 
that the ECtHR will only uphold an Article 10 restriction if 
there is a risk that the incitement will trigger the use of 
violence, an uprising, or an armed resistance.147 
An important counterweight to the need to preserve public 
order is the public‘s ―right to know‖ information important to 
public debate.  The public‘s right to know weighs heavily in the 
ECtHR‘s calculations when the subject matter is a matter of 
general importance.148  This right to know, and the importance 
 
144. See Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93, 1998-IV Eur. H.R. Rep. 449, 
481. 
145. Id. at 487. 
146. See, e.g., Karatas v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 81 (striking 
down restrictions on poems that were aggressive in tone because their limited 
distribution substantially reduced their potential impact on national 
security). 
147. See Dirk Voorhoof, Terrorism and Freedom of Expression: Impact 
on Media and Journalism, Presentation at the Council of Europe‘s Forum on 
Anti-Terrorism Legislation and its Impact on Freedom of Expression and 
Information (May 27, 2009), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/confantiterrorism/contributio
ns_27may09_en.asp (follow hyperlink after ―Dirk Voorhoof‖). 
148. See, e.g., Tromsø v. Norway, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 289, 324-25. 
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of public debate to the democratic process, are key themes in 
the Court‘s jurisprudence.  Given the importance of human 
dignity in European jurisprudence, however, the scope of 
debate is not unlimited.  The constitutional right to human 
dignity has a speech-restrictive effect on the terms of public 
debate as it is bounded by such community values as 
―pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.‖149  The norms of 
democratic governance in the European community promote 
debate, but it is a debate that favors the protection of 
individual and group dignity. 
As a general rule, the ECtHR imposes a stiff 
proportionality standard on government restriction of 
discussions on matters of general public concern.150  For 
example, in Thorgeirson v. Iceland, the Strasbourg Court found 
that Iceland had violated Article 10 when it convicted a writer 
who had written several articles criticizing police brutality on 
defamation charges.151  The Court concluded that the content of 
the articles was a matter of general public concern because 
Thorgeirson was pushing for the appointment of an 
independent commission to investigate complaints of police 
brutality.152  The mere invocation of public concern however, 
does not confer an unlimited right to free speech.  States may 
regulate speech that addresses matters of general public 
concern if the character of the speech may incite violence.153 
In sum, the ECHR establishes a framework within which 
states must operate as they seek to balance liberty and 
security.  To survive an Article 10 challenge, government 
restrictions on speech must serve an urgent social need.  Where 
the Court has found government actions to be neither 
necessary nor proportionate to the goal of maintaining public 
safety, the ECtHR has held that those restrictions have 
violated Article 10.  The Court‘s approach is consistent with the 
fact that Article 10 is a qualified rather than an absolute right. 
 
149. Errera, supra note 139, at 30 (quoting Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 754 (1976)). 
150. Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 
(1992). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 25-28. 
153. See Michael O‘Boyle, Right to Speak and Associate under 
Strasbourg Case-Law with Reference to Eastern and Central Europe, 8 CONN. 
J. INT‘L L. 263, 276 (1993). 
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One key final point is that the ECtHR does not enjoy the 
same power of review as enjoyed by the United States Supreme 
Court.  The ECHR grants member states a wide latitude of 
flexibility, essentially establishing only a minimum floor of 
rights protections.  While the fundamental rights set out in the 
Convention serve as general principles that are binding on 
member states, the free speech protections enjoyed throughout 
the European community are not monolithic.  The ECHR 
grants a ―margin of appreciation‖ to national authorities.154  
Accordingly, member states may interpret and implement the 
Convention in accord with their own national constitutional 
frameworks and domestic legislation.155  To understand how 
domestic counterterrorism legislation challenges the 
protections established in the ECHR, it is necessary at this 
point to turn to actions taken by the Council of Europe to 
coordinate member states‘ responses to terrorism. 
 
B.  European Union Council Framework Decisions on 
Combating Terrorism of 2002 & 2008 
 
In response to the threat posed by international terrorism, 
the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe have 
adopted two key directives known as the Framework Decisions 
on Combating Terrorism of 2002156 and 2008.157  These 
Framework Decisions are binding actions that aim to outline 
the direction of action undertaken by member states within the 
European Union‘s third pillar.158  While the devastating 
 
154. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1976).  See also Janneke Gerards & Hanneke Senden, The Structure of 
Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 7 INT‘L J. 
CONST. L. 619, 645-51 (2009) (discussing how the European Court of Human 
Rights applies the margin of appreciation doctrine). 
155. J.P. Loof, Remarks at the Dutch Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists Conference (―NJCM‖): Combating Terrorism with 
Human Rights (Apr. 8, 2005).  See also Casado Coca v. Spain, 285-A Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) at 20-21 (1994); Barfod v. Denmark, 149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 
12-14 (1989); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at 19-20 (1989). 
156. Council Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12. 
157. Council Framework Amendment 2008, supra note 12. 
158. While Framework Decisions are binding on member states as to the 
result that they seek to achieve, they leave the ―choice and method‖ of the 
specific action undertaken by a Member state up to the Member state itself.  
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attacks on American soil in 2001 led the Council to act, it was 
the nature of the terrorist threat itself that necessitated and 
triggered a region-wide response.  Specifically, the initial 
Framework Decision pointed to the emergence of international 
terrorist networks that could deliver lethal and devastating 
attacks as the key impetus behind the 2002 Decision.159  The 
lack of borders within the European Union as well as the 
inadequacy of traditional police and judicial responses in 
combating terrorism have also played a role in shaping the 
Council‘s response.160 
For purposes of this article, the key provisions of the 2002 
instrument include the provisions that define ―terrorist 
offences‖ and ―terrorist groups.‖  This instrument defines a 
terrorist group as ―a structured group of more than two 
persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert 
to commit terrorist offences.‖161  The Decision defines ―terrorist 
offences‖ as offenses under national law that, 
 
[G]iven their nature or context, may seriously 
damage a country or an international 
organisation where committed with the aim of: 
 seriously intimidating a population, or 
 unduly compelling a Government or 
international organisation to perform or 
abstain from performing any act, or 
 seriously destabilising or destroying the 
fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country 
or an international organisation.162 
 
The principal advantage of the 2002 Decision is that it 
harmonized the definitions of terrorism and terrorist groups 
 
See Jolande Prinssen, Domestic Legal Effects of EU Criminal Law: A Transfer 
of EC Law Doctrines?, in INTERFACE BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW 
311, 314 (D. Obradovic & N. Lavranos eds., 2007). 
159. Memorandum from the Comm‘n of the European Cmtys. Proposal 
for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 3 (Sept. 19, 
2001), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/terrorism.pdf. 
160. Id. at 8. 
161. Council Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12, at art. 2(1), 2002 
O.J. (L 164) at 4. 
162. Id. at art. 1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 164) at 4. 
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used by Member States and established a structure of 
appropriate sanctions and penalties for individuals convicted of 
terrorism-related offenses.  Although no provisions of the 2002 
instrument explicitly circumscribe the freedom of expression, 
critics have charged that governments might use the document 
to enact and justify legislation that could target 
demonstrations and protests.163  For our purposes here, it is 
worthwhile to note that the main danger of these provisions is 
that they may be, and indeed have been, combined with 
subsequent provisions to greatly circumscribe the ambit of free 
speech protections. 
In the wake of the 2004 Madrid bombings, the Council of 
Europe called for and subsequently drafted and enacted 
amendments to the 2002 Decision that called on Member 
States to criminalize ―offences linked to terrorist activities‖ 
with the aim of ―reducing the dissemination of those materials 
which might incite persons to commit terrorist attacks.‖164  The 
United Nations Security Council gave efforts to criminalize a 
wider range of speech a boost when it issued a non-binding 
resolution in September 2005.165  The resolution called upon 
States to ―to adopt such measures as may be necessary and 
appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under 
international law to . . . [p]rohibit by law incitement to commit 
a terrorist act or acts.‖166 
Given that British Prime Minister Tony Blair played a key 
 
163. See, e.g., Statewatch News Online, EU to Adopt New Rules on 
Terrorism, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/14eulaws.htm (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2010) (alleging that Article 3 of the 2002 Framework Decision 
could embrace a range of demonstrations and protests). 
164. Council Framework Amendment 2008, supra note 12, 2008 O.J. (L 
330) at 21. 
165. S.C. Res. 1624, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).  The 
resolution called upon states to ―to adopt such measures as may be necessary 
and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under international 
law to . . . [p]rohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts.‖  Id.  
While the members of the Security Council condemned any attempts to 
glorify and incite terrorist acts, the resolution also reminded states of their 
duty to protect the freedom of expression under both Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74-75, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), and 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200A, at 55, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
166. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 165, at ¶ 1(a). 
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role in drafting the Security Council resolution, it is 
unsurprising that the Council of Europe quickly directed its 
energies towards adopting a similar measure.  The proposed 
original Amendment to the 2002 Framework Decision called for 
a wide range of incitement-related provisions.  In particular, 
the proposal called for legislation that would criminalize speech 
that included ―public expressions of support for terrorist 
offences and/or groups‖; ―the instigation of ethnic and religious 
tensions which can provide a basis for terrorism‖; ―the 
dissemination of ‗hate speech‘ and the promotion of ideologies 
favourable to terrorism.‖167  In its final form, the Amendment 
was slightly narrower in scope.  The Amendment requires 
member states to enact legislation that criminalizes the acts of 
―public provocation to commit a terrorist offence[,] recruitment 
for terrorism[, and] training for terrorism.‖168 
The Amendment‘s strength is that it directs member states 
to criminally target individuals who transmit specific 
knowledge and expertise such as bomb-making information—
information which has a large potential to lead to significant 
harm.  However, the Amendment has serious flaws as well.  
Considered in conjunction with each other, the Framework 
Decision and the Decision‘s Amendment open the door to 
significant state regulation of speech.  There are three main 
problems with the Council of Europe‘s approach.  First, the 
legislation potentially criminalizes legitimate democratic 
discourse.  Second, the instrument dramatically attenuates the 
previously required link between speech and conduct.  Finally, 
the instrument allows Member States to demonstrate only a 
tenuous link between the speech act and the subsequent 
violent conduct before sanctioning the speech. 
The starting point for analyzing these three problems is 
the European Union‘s definition of terrorism set forth in the 
initial Framework Decision.169  To begin, the definition should 
 
167. Ben Hayes, Criminalising Free Speech, SPECTREZINE, Oct. 28, 2008, 
http://www.spectrezine.org/europe/Hayes2.htm. 
168. Council Framework Amendment 2008, supra note 12, at art. 
1(2)(a)-(c), 2008 O.J. (L 330) at 23.  See also Press Release, Council of Eur., 
Amendment of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (Apr. 18, 
2008),  available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/255. 
169. Council Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12, at art. 1(1), 2002 
O.J. (L 164) at 4. 
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be seen as a step forward because it contains both subjective as 
well as objective elements.  The definition‘s objective element 
includes language that relates to a series of specific actions 
such as bombings, attacks against shipping and aircraft, 
hostage-taking, attacks involving nuclear material, and attacks 
against internationally protected persons.170  Standing alone, 
the catalogue restricts the scope of government discretion with 
respect to the list of crimes that may qualify as a terrorist act.  
Unfortunately the catalogue of acts does not stand alone as the 
definition includes a subjectively drawn ―motive‖ element that 
possesses the power to transform an ordinary criminal act into 
an offense committed by a terrorist.  Those motives include 
―seriously intimidating a population‖ and ―unduly compelling a 
Government or international organisation to perform or 
abstain from performing any act.‖171  These subjective elements 
open the door to a wide range of potential actions that may be 
subsumed within the definition.  Indeed, depending on a 
prosecutor‘s motives, the potential list of free speech activities 
that fall within the ambit of those definitions could include, for 
example, protests against the World Trade Organization and 
the G8, as well as calls for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  The key problem is that the provision grants 
prosecutors a wide berth in identifying what speech ―seriously 
intimidates a population.‖  By necessity, the process of 
determining what speech falls within this category involves a 
subjective process of interpretation.  Consequently, law 
enforcement personnel may presume the motive or intent of the 
speaker based on identifying characteristics of the speaker 
such as religion or race. 
The problems with the Amendment are most apparent 
when the definition of terrorism detailed in the Framework 
Decision is read in conjunction with the Amendment.  The 
Amendment mandates that Member States enact penal code 
provisions criminalizing the act of ―public provocation to 
commit a terrorist offence.‖172  It defines provocation as the: 
 
 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Council Framework Amendment 2008, supra note 12, 2008 O.J. (L 
330) at ¶ 9. 
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[D]istribution, or otherwise making available, of 
a message to the public with the intent to incite 
the commission of one of the offences listed in 
Article 1(1)(a) to (h), where such conduct, 
whether or not directly advocating terrorist 
offences, causes a danger that one or more such 
offences may be committed.173 
 
The pivotal problem with the definition of provocation is that it 
does not require the offending conduct be directly linked with 
the advocacy of terrorist offences.  As a result, it is possible 
that an individual‘s written or oral support for causes, such as 
the Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation, could fall 
within the Council‘s definition of public provocation of 
terrorism.174  The International Commission of Jurists has 
alleged that this provision will allow Member States to 
 
173. Id. at art. 1(1), 2008 O.J. (L. 330) at 22 (amending Council 
Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12, at art. 3(1)(a)).  The offenses listed 
in Article 1(1)(a) through (h) include: 
 
(a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;  
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; 
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking; 
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public 
facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, 
including an information system, a fixed platform located on 
the continental shelf, a public place or private property 
likely to endanger human life or result in major economic 
loss; 
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or 
goods transport; 
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply 
or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons, as well as research into, and 
development of, biological and chemical weapons; 
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods 
or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; 
[and] 
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power 
or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of 
which is to endanger human life . . . . 
 
Council Framework Decision 2002, supra note 12, at art. 1(1)(a)-(h), 2002 
O.J. (L 164) at 4. 
174. See Hayes, supra note 167. 
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criminalise ―legitimate political debate.‖175  Just as seriously, 
the Council‘s decision to target content that may be linked with 
terrorism could lead government law enforcement agencies to 
monitor press activity, work to identify protected sources, and 
monitor journalists‘ research activities.176  These problems are 
not merely speculative.  As demonstrated in earlier research, 
prosecutors responding to domestic political unrest have 
previously used the cover of terrorism to prosecute the political 
opposition.177  In 2007, the Council of Ministers themselves 
cautioned that governments might be tempted to impose undue 
restrictions on the exercise of the principle of freedom of 
expression.178  The Council warned states not to ―use vague 
terms when imposing restrictions of freedom of expression and 
information in times of crisis.‖179 
The second major problem with the Amendment is that it 
dramatically broadens the criminal definition of incitement.  
Specifically, the Amendment removes any requirement that the 
conduct directly incite the commission of terrorist acts.  The 
absence of a requirement of a direct link between speech and 
conduct drastically curtails the ambit of speech protection.  In 
contrast, the American incitement standard defined in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio requires the state to show that the 
advocacy ―is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action‖ and is ―likely to incite or produce such action‖ before 
the state may regulate expression that advocates the use of 
 
175. INT‘L COMM‘N OF JURISTS, BRIEFING PAPER: AMENDMENT TO THE 
FRAMEWORK DECISION COMBATING TERRORISM—PROVOCATION TO COMMIT A 
TERRORIST OFFENCE 2 (2008), available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/FD2007-
650.pdf. 
176. Letter from Max von Abendroth, Dir. of Commc‘n & Sustainability, 
European Fed‘n of Magazine Publishers, to Maria del Carmen Guilleu-Sanz, 
European Comm‘n (Feb. 9, 2007), available at  
http://www.faep.org/upload/FAEP%20position%20on%20Combating%20Terro
rism%2009022007.pdf. 
177. See Boyne, supra note 26, at 81 (maintaining that German 
prosecutors used anti-terrorism statutes to prosecute squatters). 
178. Eur. Consult. Ass‘n, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on Protecting Freedom of Expression and Information in 
Times of Crisis, 117th Sess., Doc. No. 
CM/Del/Dec(2007)1005/5.3/appendix11E, pmbl. ¶ 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/fight_against_terrorism 
/2_adopted_texts/Guidelines%20media%202008%20E.pdf. 
179. Id. ¶ 19. 
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force or violation of law.180 
Thirdly, an additional risk that accompanies incitement-to-
violence statutes is situated in the specific context of terrorism.  
These statutes run the risk that the link between speech and 
subsequent violent conduct will be neither immediate nor 
direct, but extremely tenuous.  Because many governments 
now consider that terrorism will pose a threat far out into the 
future, the fight against terrorism may last a lifetime.181  
Viewed in this light, one can imagine that a prosecutor could 
charge a speaker under these provisions for a communication 
made five years prior to a particular terrorist act. 
These problems demonstrate how the Amendment‘s 
incitement-related provisions enlarge the sphere of state 
interference with speech.  The major flaw with the 
Amendment, however, is that it expands prosecutorial 
discretion to a degree that is unwarranted by the legislation‘s 
efficacy in fighting terrorism.  The research presented in the 
first section of this Article demonstrates that there are many 
paths to becoming a radical Islamic terrorist.  Merely reading 
or listening to radical speech does not by itself transform an 
individual into a terrorist.  Thus, efforts to criminalize 
provocation are likely to restrict speech over-broadly with little 
chance of crippling the radicalization process.  Legislation at 
the member state level that criminalizes indirect speech-
related incitement will not put a meaningful stop to 
radicalization.  Instead, it is likely that the anti-provocation 
provisions will merely drive speech underground to places that 
are more difficult for governments to monitor.  Ironically, it is 
the success of counterterrorism efforts themselves that has 
diffused the impact of incitement-related speech.  For example, 
one reason that the internet has come to play a more 
prominent role in the recruitment process is that police stepped 
 
180. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
181. From 1917 to 1969, there was a major debate in the United States 
concerning the problem of organized anti-government conspiracies that might 
smolder over time.  See generally Peter Knight, Making Sense of Conspiracy 
Theories, in CONSPIRACY THEORIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
15, 17-24 (Peter Knight ed., 2003) (discussing the historical role conspiracy 
theories have played in the cultural and political framework of American 
history).  In the wake of 9/11, this debate has reignited.  See, e.g., Tom 
Squitieri, Top General: War on Terror Will Last Lifetime, USA TODAY, June 
16, 2004, at 8A. 
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up their surveillance of radical mosques.  Evidence suggests 
that police surveillance of radical mosques has caused 
radicalizers to direct potential recruits to stay away from 
mosques.182 
 The research on radicalization suggests that attempts to 
criminalize speech that only has an indirect or tenuous 
relationship with a violent terrorist act will greatly expand 
governments‘ power to punish speech with little impact on 
counterterrorism efforts.  Despite the fact that the provocation-
related legislation runs the risk of chilling debate, the majority 
of Member States have adopted legislation in compliance with 
the Amendment.  Before examining the shift in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the legislative action that several 
Member States have taken to comply with the Amendment to 
the Common Framework Decision on Terrorism will be briefly 
explained. 
 
C. The Legislative “Response” by Member States 
 
Though the Council of Europe‘s Member States adopted 
the Framework Amendment following the London and Madrid 
bombings, a number of states enacted incitement-related 
provisions prior to the Council‘s actions.  In particular, France 
and Spain had enacted legislation criminalizing the advocacy 
and glorification of terrorism well before 9/11.  The date of the 
French legislation reaches all the way back to 1881,183 while 
the original Spanish provisions date back to 2000.184  Moreover, 
in those states that had not adopted legislation that specifically 
criminalized incitement to terrorism, prosecutors used existing 
statutes that criminalized the incitement of general crimes to 
achieve similar purposes.185  The major sea change that 
 
182. HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE 
BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2005-6, H.C. 1087, at 31 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf. 
183. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
184. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
185. ANNA OEHMICHEN, TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION: 
THE TERRORISED LEGISLATOR? 238 (2009) (describing the adoption of anti-
organized crime acts in Germany in the early 1990s, which were 
simultaneously applied in the prosecution of terrorists).  See also JAMES 
BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
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occurred after the London bombings was that Europe as a 
whole aimed to shift the focus of its counterterrorism strategy 
to preventive measures.  Those measures included more 
comprehensive deportment and detention policies, as well as 
policies specifically designed to disrupt the radicalization and 
recruitment process.186  The true import of these 
criminalization statutes can only be understood against this 
backdrop.  When statutory language grants prosecutors wide 
discretion, and when prosecutors exercise that discretion 
against a backdrop of broad public support for the state‘s 
counterterrorism policies, the door is open for prosecutorial 
overreaching. 
The extent and character of that overreaching depends on 
the shape of a particular state‘s legislation.  Despite the fact 
that the 2008 Amendment requires Member-States to 
criminalize the incitement to terrorism, states have enjoyed 
great latitude in choosing how to translate those requirements 
into domestic legal regimes.187  European prosecutors who seek 
to criminally punish individuals who engage in incitement-
related speech now possess a plethora of penal code provisions 
to facilitate that task.  As of this date, many European penal 
codes contain provisions that criminalize speech that glorifies 
or intends to incite terrorism.  Some of those provisions are 
detailed in Table 1 below: 
 
 
ANTI-TERRORISM 55 (2007) (discussing how the U.K. initially used traditional 
criminal offenses to combat terrorism). 
186. BANISAR, supra note 20, at 8, 10. 
187. Rory Brady, Terrorism and the Rule of Law: A European 
Perspective, 48 VA. J. INT‘L L. 647, 655 (2008) (pointing out that each state 
enjoys a liberal margin of appreciation in shaping its response to terrorism in 
its territory). 
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TABLE 1: LEGISLATION THAT CRIMINALIZES SPEECH 
 
State Provision Language 
France Article 24 of the French 
Press Act of 1881 
Punishes 
incitement and 
glorification of 
terrorism188 
Germany 
 
Section 140 of the Penal 
Code 
Section 129 of the Penal 
Code 
Punishes 
statements that 
approve of 
unlawful acts189 
 
188. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse [Law on Liberty of 
the Press of July 29, 1881], Journal Officiel de la République Français [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], July 29, 1881, p. 125, at art. 24 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070
722&dateTexte=20090723 (―Seront punis des peines prévues par l'alinéa 1er 
ceux qui, par les mêmes moyens, auront provoqué directement aux actes de 
terrorisme prévus par le titre II du livre IV du code pénal, ou qui en auront 
fait l'apologie.‖) (translated by author).  This Act prohibits the advocacy of 
terrorism by means of: 
 
[S]peeches, shouts or threats proffered in public places or 
meetings, or by written words, printed matter, drawings, 
engravings, paintings, emblems, pictures or any other 
written spoken, or pictorial aid, sold or distributed, offered 
for sale or displayed in public places or meetings, either by 
posters or notices displayed for public view, or by any means 
of electronic communication. 
 
Id. at art. 23 (―discours, cris ou menaces proférés dans des lieux ou réunions 
publics, soit par des écrits, imprimés, dessins, gravures, peintures, emblèmes, 
images ou tout autre support de l'écrit, de la parole ou de l'image vendus ou 
distribués, mis en vente ou exposés dans des lieux ou réunions publics, soit 
par des placards ou des affiches exposés au regard du public, soit par tout 
moyen de communication au public par voie électronique‖) (translated by 
author). 
189. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl.I] [Federal Law Gazette I] 945, 3322, § 140, ¶ 
2 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm 
(stating that whoever ―publicly, in a meeting or through dissemination of 
writings . . . , and in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace, 
approves of one of the unlawful acts named in Sections 138 . . . , after it has 
been committed or attempted in a punishable manner‖ shall be punished 
(translation provided by the German Federal Ministry of Justice)).  The 
crimes that qualify pursuant to Section 138 include preparation for a war of 
aggression, high treason, counterfeiting of money, human trafficking, and 
murder, manslaughter or genocide.  Id. § 138, ¶¶ 1-9 (translation provided by 
the German Federal Ministry of Justice). 
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Punishes 
individuals who 
support or recruit 
for certain types of 
organizations190 
Spain Article 578 of the Penal 
Code 
Prohibits 
glorification of 
terrorism as well 
as the ―commission 
of acts tending to 
discredit, demean, 
or humiliate the 
victims of terrorist 
offences or their 
families.‖ 191 
 
190. Id. § 129a, ¶ 1(1) (stating that ―[w]hoever forms an organization, 
the objectives or activity of which are directed towards the commission of . . . 
murder, manslaughter, or genocide . . . ; crimes against personal liberty . . . ; 
or crimes . . . dangerous to the public . . . shall be punished with 
imprisonment from one year to ten years‖) (translation provided by the 
German Federal Ministry of Jusice); id. § 129a, ¶ 3 (stating that ―[w]hoever 
supports an organization indicated in subsection (1) or recruits for it, shall be 
punished with imprisonment from six months to five years‖) (translation 
provided by the German Federal Ministry of Justice). 
191. Código Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] art. 578 (Spain) (―o la realización 
de actos que entrañen descrédito, menosprecio o humillación de las víctimas 
de los delitos terroristas o de sus familiares‖) (translated by author), 
available at 
http://www.searchsystems.net/frame.php?id=7e48b4dd816f468eb66edf976bb1
6d29&delay=true&nid=1215.  The Spanish Penal Code defines provocation as 
the ―direct incitement, through the press, radio or any other similarly 
effective means of publicity, or before a group of individuals, to the 
perpetration of the offence.‖  Id. art. 18(1) (―La provocación existe cuando 
directamente se incita por medio de la imprenta, la radiodifusión o cualquier 
otro medio de eficacia semejante, que facilite la publicidad, o ante una 
concurrencia de personas, a la perpetración de un delito.‖) (translated by 
author).  The Code defines apologie as: 
 
The expression, before a group of individuals or by any other 
means of communication, of ideas or doctrines that extol 
crime or glorify the perpetrator therof.  Apologie shall be 
criminalized only as a form of provocation and if its nature 
and circumstances are such as to constitute direct 
incitement to commit an offense. 
 
Id. (―Es apología, a los efectos de este Código, la exposición, ante una 
concurrencia de personas o por cualquier medio de difusión, de ideas o 
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Turkey 2006 Counterterrorism 
Law 
Sanctions those 
who ―make 
propaganda for a 
terrorist 
organization or for 
its aims.‖192 
United 
Kingdom 
Anti-Terrorism Act 2006 Criminalizes 
statements that 
may be understood 
as encouraging or 
glorifying 
terrorism193 
 
Many of the problems with the 2008 Amendment detailed 
in the preceding Section have not been corrected at the member 
state level.  For example, legislation introduced in several 
states allows the state to convict an individual of 
encouragement or incitement to terrorism where the 
encouragement is merely indirect.  Where statutes criminalize 
mere indirect encouragement, a prosecutor need not show a 
cause-and-effect relationship between the speech act in 
question and the preparation for or commission of a specific act 
of terrorism.  Proof for this premise can be seen in the United 
Kingdom‘s Terrorism Act of 2006.  The Act, which prohibits the 
 
doctrinas que ensalcen el crimen o enaltezcan a su autor.  La apología sólo 
será delictiva como forma de provocación y si por su naturaleza y 
circunstancias constituye una incitación directa a cometer un delito.‖) 
(translated by author). 
192. Law to Fight Terrorism, No. 3713, art. 7(2) (1991), amended by No. 
5532, art. 6 (2006) (Turk.).  See also BANISAR, supra note 20, at 21. 
193. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1(3) (Eng.). 
 
For the purposes of this section, the statements that are 
likely to be understood by members of the public as 
indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of 
acts of terrorism . . . include every statement which— 
(a) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the 
past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; and 
(b) is a statement from which those members of the public 
could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being 
glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be 
emulated by them in existing circumstances. 
 
Id. 
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indirect encouragement of the preparation or commission of 
terrorist acts, includes statements that: 
 
(a) glorif[y] the commission or preparation 
(whether in the past, in the future or generally) 
of such acts or offences; and 
(b) [are] statement[s] from which those members 
of the public could reasonably be expected to 
infer that what is being glorified is being 
glorified as conduct that should be emulated by 
them in existing circumstances.194 
 
According to the language of this statute, it would appear that 
a statement that in any way  commented positively on a past 
terrorist act would fall under the statute‘s scope.  It is 
conceivable that a statement to the effect, for example, that 
―the London bombers executed a near flawless plan,‖ might rise 
to the level of glorifying terrorism under this statute.195  Critics 
of the legislation have raised concerns that the statute will 
restrict reporting.196 
The broad scope of these provisions has drawn criticism 
from human rights organizations as well.  The United 
Kingdom-based human rights organization, the National 
Council for Civil Liberties (―Liberty‖), has questioned whether 
these provisions will ―inhibit[ ] legitimate freedom of 
expression.‖197  Liberty has charged that the provision that 
criminalizes the encouragement and glorification of terrorism 
goes ―far beyond what the Convention require[s].‖198  Unlike 
 
194. Id. 
195. Eric Barendt, Threats to Freedom of Speech in the United 
Kingdom?, 28 U. N.S.W. L.J. 895, 896 (2005). 
196. IAN CRAM, TERROR AND THE WAR ON DISSENT: FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF AL-QAEDA 103-05 (2009) (discussing the effect of 
the United Kingdom‘s Terror Act of 2006 dissemination provision on news 
broadcast organizations, academic institutions, and libraries). 
197. JAGO RUSSELL & ETHAN HUNT, NAT‘L COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, 
LIBERTY‘S RESPONSE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy06/council-of-europe-
convention-on-terrorism.pdf. 
198. Id. at 4.  Liberty argues that the Terrorism Act of 2006 created 
broad new offenses that ―have had a disproportionate impact on . . . rights 
and freedoms.‖  Id. 
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the Convention, the Terrorism Act of 2006 does not require 
that a person who makes a statement or publishes a document 
actually ―intend to incite the commission of a terrorist 
offence.‖199  Thus, statements that only indirectly encourage 
terrorism, including statements made by speakers who did not 
specifically intend to incite or glorify a terrorist act, fall within 
this statute‘s ambit.200  What is more, the legislative language 
allows the government to criminally sanction statements that 
merely glorify terrorist acts or the preparation for those acts.  
As a result, this new legislation has definitively widened the 
scope of the law prohibiting incitement by eviscerating any 
intent requirement, and by widening the scope of the law to 
include glorification.201 
Spain has joined the United Kingdom at the forefront of 
efforts to broaden the application of its penal code to speech-
related conduct.202  Spain‘s enactment of provisions related to 
incitement and glorification of terrorism is unsurprising given 
the nature of the Spanish government‘s ongoing battle with 
ETA.203  In considering the scope of the Spanish legislation, it 
is also important to note that Spain‘s experience with 
democratic governance and toleration of political dissent is a 
relatively recent one.  The Spanish provisions allow the 
government to punish support or encouragement of a criminal 
offense.204  On their face, these provisions appear to be even 
more susceptible to overbreadth problems than the United 
Kingdom‘s provisions.  The terms of the Spanish code 
criminalize ―any praise or justification of terrorist offenses or of 
those involved in committing them through any form of public 
 
199. Id. at 5. 
200. See id. at 5-6. 
201. See Ben Saul, Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to 
Violence, 28 U. N.S.W. L.J. 868, 870-71 (2005) (Austl.). 
202. See Código Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] art. 18.1 (Spain); supra note 
191 (discussing the relevant content of the Código Penal). 
203. The Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (―ETA‖), a Spanish separatist 
organization founded in 1959 and currently classified as a terrorist 
organization by Spain, the United States, and other countries, has been 
responsible for numerous acts of terrorism for the past four decades.  See 
PREETI BHATTACHARJI, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BASQUE FATHERLAND 
AND LIBERTY (ETA) (SPAIN, SEPARATISTIS, ESUKADI TA ASKATASUNA) (2008), 
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9271;%20Who%20are%20Eta?; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europ/3500728.stm. 
204. See C.P. art. 18.1; supra note 191. 
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expression or broadcast.‖205  Notably, the law grants the 
government the power to criminally sanction any praise or 
justification of terrorist offenses or of the perpetrators of 
terrorist offenses through any form of public expression.  The 
ambit of speech that may fall under this provision is especially 
broad because Spain‘s definition of terrorist offenses includes 
acts that are typically categorized as common offenses.206  
Spanish law even goes so far as to prohibit speech that insults 
victims of terrorist acts or their families.207  The potentially 
broad reach of this statute was underscored when the 
government attempted to use it to prosecute a punk band on 
the grounds that their lyrics glorified terrorism and degraded 
victims.208 
Ironically, in 1995, Spain had moved to restrict 
prosecutions under the Spanish crime of apology by 
implementing a requirement that forced prosecutors to show 
that the speech in question qualified as a direct and intentional 
incitement.  This move towards greater protection of speech 
lasted a mere five years.209  Concerned about the ETA‘s 
obstinacy, Spain reintroduced the crime of exalting terrorism 
in the Organic Act of 2000.210  The violent resurgence of ETA in 
2000, which began with the end of a fourteen month ceasefire 
in December 1999, played a key role in opening the government 
to criticism that it had not acted aggressively enough towards 
the organization.211  Seen in this context, it is unsurprising that 
 
205. José Luis de la Cuesta, Anti-Terrorist Penal Legislation and the 
Rule of Law: Spanish Experience, 2007 ELECTRONIC REV. INT‘L ASS‘N PENAL L. 
1, 7 (follow link for article ―A-03‖) 
http://www.penal.org/?page=mainaidp&id_rubrique=41&id_article=158. 
206. Those acts include ―arson and criminal damage, causing loss of 
human life, causing serious bodily harm, abduction and unlawful detention.‖  
Id. at 6.  See also C.P. arts. 571, 572.1, 572.3, 573. 
207. C.P. art. 578.  See also BANISAR, supra note 20, at 21; supra note 
191 and accompanying text. 
208. BANISAR, supra note 20, at 21. 
209. See PEDRO TENORIO, THE IMPACT OF ANTITERRORISM LEGISLATION IN 
THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SPAIN 16-20, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/confantiterrorism/Spain_PT
ENORIO_dec.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). 
210. Organic Law 7/2000 of Dec. 22, 2000 (codified at C.P. art. 578), 
amending Organic Law 10/1995 of Nov. 23, 1995. 
211. Frank Griffiths, ETA Violence in 2000: A Year in Review, 
SUITE101.COM, Jan. 16, 2001, 
http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/spanish_politics/57590/1. 
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the Spanish government‘s tolerance of critical speech narrowed 
in 2000. 
France‘s legislation criminalizing incitement and advocacy 
of terrorism dates back to the Act of 28 July 1881 on the press 
and media.212  The French legislature has enacted amendments 
to this act that impose criminal penalties on offenders who 
incite hatred or violence.213  While the act‘s language requires 
that the speech constitute a direct incitement, the definition of 
the types of speech that may qualify under this statute is so 
broad that it could well include works of art.  One can see this 
by looking at the code itself.  The code specifically states that 
the incitement must have been communicated via: 
 
[S]peeches, shouts or threats proffered in public 
places or meetings, or by written words, printed 
matter, drawings, engravings, paintings, 
emblems, pictures or any other written, spoke or 
pictorial aid, sold or distributed, offered for sale 
or displayed in public places or meetings, either 
by posters or notices displayed for public view, or 
by any means of electronic communication.214 
 
In the French system, which reflects a legal tradition 
dating back to the Napoleonic era, investigating magistrates 
wield broad powers in conducting terrorism investigations.215  
While the investigative judges have largely concentrated their 
efforts on individuals involved in Islamic, Basque, and Corsican 
separatist terrorist causes, their broad prevention-oriented 
powers raise due process concerns.  In particular, magistrates 
 
212. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, J.O., July 29, 1881, 
p. 125, at art. 24 (Fr.).  See also supra note 188. 
213. See, e.g., Law of July 28, 1991, J.O. at art. 24 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070
722&dateTexte=19910728#LEGIARTI000006419712 (imposing correctional 
penalties on ―those who, by any of the means referred to in article 23, incite 
to hatred or violence against a person or group of persons on account of their 
origin or membership or non-membership of a particular ethnic group, 
nation, race or religion‖) (translated by author). 
214. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, J.O., at art. 23.  
See also supra note 188. 
215. See Craig Whitlock, French Push Limits in Fight on Terrorism, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1. 
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possess the power to detain terrorism suspects on the mere 
suspicion that they are associated with a group formed to 
commit terrorist acts.216  Human rights groups have alleged 
that French authorities are using this statute not to prosecute 
individuals but rather ―to gather evidence about possible future 
attacks.‖217  Given that French investigators have exploited the 
vague language used in this statute to proactively detain 
suspects, it is not surprising that the similarly ambiguous 
language in the anti-incitement legislation has led to similar 
overreaching. 
This has proven to be the case with the enforcement of 
anti-incitement related provisions in the French immigration 
code.  A law enacted in 2004 allows French authorities to use 
administrative measures to expel non-citizens who are found to 
have engaged in ―incitement to discrimination, hatred or 
violence against a specific person or group of persons.‖218  
French authorities have relied on this provision to expel non-
citizens on the basis of unsigned intelligence reports that 
disclose neither the source of the information nor the method 
used to obtain the information.  As the 2008 Human Rights 
Watch report states: 
 
In practice . . . the lack of precision of the legal 
concept of a threat to public order, the 
comparatively low standard of proof in the 
system of administrative justice, and the benefit 
of the doubt most judges accord the intelligence 
 
216. See Code Pénal [C. PÉN] [Penal Code] art. 421-2-1 (Fr.), available at 
http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=33&r=3794#art16571.  
Legislation enacted in January 2006 makes participation in an association 
formed for the purposes of committing a terrorist act that could lead to the 
death of one or more persons a felony offense punishable by up to 20 years 
imprisonment.  Id. at art. 421-2-2.  The statute punishes ―[t]he participation 
in any group formed or association established with a view to the 
preparation, marked by one or more material actions.‖  Id. at art. 421-2-1. 
217. See UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROSECUTION AND 
PRE-CHARGE DETENTION ¶ 92 (2006), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/240/24005
.htm (follow ―Offence of  ‗Association of Wrongdoers‘‖). 
218. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF PREVENTION: 
INSUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY REMOVALS 56-64 (2007), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/05/name-prevention-0 
(follow ―Download this report‖). 
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reports, make it difficult for a person effectively 
to contest the expulsion.219 
 
In contrast to the actions taken by Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and France, Germany has walked away from plans 
to introduce a specific ―glorification of terrorism‖ offense.  Nor 
has Germany introduced legislation that specifically 
criminalizes the act ―incitement to terrorism.‖  
Notwithstanding these decisions, the German government still 
has plenty of tools in its arsenal to target radical speech.  These 
tools include provisions that criminally sanction the incitement 
of racial hatred.220  Under that provision, it is a crime to ―incite[ 
] hatred against segments of the population or [to] call[ ] for 
violent or arbitrary measures against them.‖221  The 
government may also ban groups that operate ―against the idea 
of international understanding‖ contained in the German 
Constitution.222  After 9/11 Germany stiffened existing 
legislation and enacted new provisions regarding the offense of 
recruitment for terrorist organizations, and has convicted 
individuals for incitement-related activity under the statutes.  
For example, in 2008, a German court convicted Ibrahim 
Rashid for violations of Sections 129(a) and 129(b) for posting 
videos of car bombings and sniper attacks with supportive 
commentary.223 
Taken as a whole, a key problem with the legislation 
enacted in many European states is that prosecutors need not 
establish an evidentiary link between speech and subsequent 
harm to obtain a conviction.  For example, under French law, 
speech-related incitement is punishable even if it does not 
 
219. Id. 
220. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl.I] [Federal Law Gazette I] 945, 3222, § 130 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm. 
221. Id. § 130, ¶ 1(1) (translation provided by the German Federal 
Ministry of Justice). 
222. Id. § 85, ¶ 1(2) (translation provided by the German Federal 
Ministry of Justice). 
223. For a detailed discussion of that case, see Shawn Marie Boyne, The 
Criminalization of Speech in an Age of Terror: Casting a Wide Net for 
Evildoers, in RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND TORTURE: PERSPECTIVES ON EVIL, LAW 
AND THE STATE 193 (John Parry & Welat Zeydanlioglu eds., 2009). 
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incite the commission of a criminal offense.224  The omission of 
any link thus allows prosecutors and courts to punish 
individuals on the basis of mere speculation that the speech 
could incite a terrorist act.  Under the United Kingdom‘s 2006 
Terrorism Act, the state has criminalized general acts of 
―encouragement‖ of terrorism that are not tied to specific acts 
of terrorism.225  Under this provision, individuals who make 
statements recklessly may face criminal sanctions.226  The 
danger with incitement legislation is that every idea taken to 
its extreme may constitute incitement.227  Under Germany‘s 
doctrinal framework, the link between speech and harm must 
be more direct.  As German legal scholar Abin Eser points out, 
a mere ―indirect exhortation,‖ such as a general call for 
murder, ―fall[s] within the ambit of protected expression‖ under 
German law.228 
Standing alone, this catalogue of legislative provisions does 
not accurately portray the state of freedom of expression in 
Europe.  In states that have enacted specific provisions, their 
presence does not guarantee that convictions will survive the 
scrutiny of a state‘s highest court.  For example, in December 
2007, a lower court judge in the United Kingdom convicted the 
so-called ―lyrical terrorist‖ for violating Section 58 of the 
Terrorism Act of 2000 for possessing information useful to a 
person committing or preparing an act of terrorism 229  Samina 
Malik‘s crimes included the fact that she wrote and posted on 
 
224. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1624: Report of France in Response to the Questions of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, in Letter from Ellen Margrethe Løj, Chairman, Security Council 
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning 
Counter-Terrorism, to the President of the Security Council app. at 3, U.N. 
Doc. S/2006/547 (July 19, 2006) (submitted on behalf of France by Jean-Marc 
de La Sablière, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations). 
225. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1(3) (Eng.).  See also supra notes 193-
94 and accompanying text. 
226. See Raphael F. Perl, Head of the Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in 
Eur. Action Against Terrorism Unit, Remarks at the Second International 
Forum on Information Security (Apr. 7-10, 2008), available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2008/04/30594_en.pdf. 
227. See BECKMAN, supra note 185, at 19. 
228. Albin Eser, The Law of Incitement and the Use of Speech to Incite 
Others to Commit Criminal Acts: German Law in Comparative Perspective, in 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 
119, 133. 
229. Regina v. Malik [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1450, [1], [4], [15] (Eng.). 
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websites poetry that glorified terrorism and also possessed 
materials that could be helpful to terrorists.230  In June 2008, 
however, the Court of Appeal quashed her conviction on the 
grounds that it ―was unsafe.‖231  Ultimately, in the realm of the 
criminal courts where appellate processes exist, the scope of 
enforcement is shaped by judicial action. 
Even Turkey‘s Constitutional Court has started to push 
back on Turkey‘s Counterterrorism Law of 2006, which an 
expert committee of the Council of Europe has criticized as 
being ―ambiguous and written in wide and vague terms.‖232  
While the Turkish government has repeatedly sought to punish 
political opponents and non-incitement-related speech, in a 
January 2008 decision, Turkey‘s Constitutional Court, by a 
single vote, struck down a government ban on the pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party (―DTP‖), stating that ―statements 
about the Kurdish problem fall within the boundaries of free 
speech.‖233  However, in a separate ruling issued in December 
2009, the Court reversed itself and unanimously banned the 
party for its alleged links with the outlawed Kurdistan 
Workers‘ Party (―PKK‖).  In announcing the ruling, the court‘s 
President, Hasim Kilic, stated that ―[i]t has been decided the 
DTP will be closed under Articles 68 and 69 of the  Constitution 
and the Political Parties Law given that actions and 
statements made by the party became a focal point for 
terrorism against the indivisible integrity of  the state.‖234 
The absence of specific provisions that criminalize 
incitement or glorification of terrorism does not mean that 
prosecutors have not indicted individuals for incitement or 
 
230. Id. [5], [15]. 
231. Id. [3]. 
232. EUR. PAR. ASS‘N, COMM. OF EXPERTS ON TERRORISM, Information on 
Other Activities of the Council of Europe, 12th Meeting, at 21 (2007), 
available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/fight_against_terrorism/3_codexter/working_documents/2007/COD
EXTER%20(2007)%2014%20E%20PACE.pdf. 
233. Constitutional Court Decision No. 2008/1, 29/01/2008, 7 Jan. 2008, 
Official Gazette of Turkish Republic, Serial No. 26925 (Turk.).  See also 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009: EVENTS OF 2008, at 418 (2009), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf. 
234. Constitutional Court Decision No. 2009/4, 11/12/2009, 14 Dec. 2009, 
Official Gazette of Turkish Republic, Serial No. 27432 (Turk.).  See also 
Turkey Shuts Down Kurdish Political Party, ASBAREZ.COM, Dec. 11, 2009, 
http://www.asbarez.com/74747/turkey-shuts-down-kurdish-political-party/. 
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glorification related conduct using other provisions of a state‘s 
legal codes.  For example, the German government has banned 
the activities of the radical Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir on the 
ground that the group violated ―the concept of international 
understanding.‖235  While there is no evidence that the group 
issued calls to immediate violence in Germany, according to 
some commentators, the group‘s rhetoric is ―evocative of 
jihad.‖236 
In sum, the aforementioned provisions may have troubling 
political connotations for democratic governance in the Council 
of Europe member states.  Anxious to hand prosecutors more 
tools to fight terrorism, many states have ignored the fact that 
these increased government powers could be abused and used 
to target political opponents.  Depending on the lens through 
which a government views the existing domestic political order, 
some governments might recast complaints voiced by the 
political opposition as threats to public order.  The broad 
definition of terrorism present in state-level legislation 
increases the likelihood that anxious governments might affix 
the terrorist label to the political opposition.  While this 
prospect may be less likely in a state with a strong post-war 
record of democratic governance, it is a real concern in states 
such as Armenia, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine.237  The 
 
235. Sophie Lambroschini, Germany: Court Appeal by Hizb Ut-Tahrir 
Highlights Balancing Act Between Actions, Intentions, RADIO FREE EUROPE 
RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 26, 2004, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055527.html. 
236. Id. 
237. See RUSSELL & HUNT, supra note 197, at 8-9 (arguing ‗[t]here is a 
vast difference between proscribing groups involved in violence and terror 
and non-violent political groups‖).  See also, e.g., POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
TERRORIST GROUPS 10 (Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, & Arie Perliger 
eds., 2d ed. 2009) (indicating the political support of terrorism dating back to 
1902 with the Social Revolutionary Party); Jonathan Head, Turkey Jails 
Kurdish Newspaper Editor, BBCNEWS.COM, Feb. 10, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8509455.stm (discussing the ramification of 
the criminal penalty imposed on a newspaper editor for publishing material 
sympathetic to the outlawed PKK political party); Clifford J. Levy, For 
Kremlin, Ukraine Vote Cut 2 Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at A1 
(discussing Ukraine‘s political turmoil following the unsuccessful political bid 
of Viktor F. Yanukovich in the 2004 Orange Revolution); Press Release, 
Council of Eur., Commissioner Hammarberg Calls on the Armenian 
Government to Lift Emergency Measures, Ensure Media Freedom and 
Initiate an Impartial Investigation into Recent Violent Acts, (Mar. 18, 2008), 
available at 
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language of current anti-incitement statutes gives government 
officials the ability to censor political viewpoints, should they 
elect to use it.238  These problems led the Council of Europe‘s 
Committee of Ministers in September 2007 to caution 
European Union member states against using ―vague terms‖ 
such as the words ―incitement‖ and ―glorification‖ to limit 
freedom of expression.239  In 2008, the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee criticized the United Kingdom‘s 
―encouragement of terrorism‖ provisions noting that they were 
―broad and vague‖ and lacked an intent requirement.240 
This Section argues that, although some European states 
enacted new legislation after the attacks on London and 
Madrid that was hostile to freedom of expression, because the 
anti-incitement and glorification statutes of some states pre-
dated those events, the ECtHR had already developed a 
doctrinal roadmap that, in some cases, privileged national 
security concerns.  Thus, for the most part, the ECtHR has not 
needed to drastically reshape that roadmap to accommodate 
this new wave of legislation; a roadmap was already in place 
that allowed states to privilege national security at the expense 
of freedom of expression without infringing upon Article 10 
restrictions when states could justify those restrictions on 
national security grounds.  Section III will show how that 
opening has widened. 
 
III.  Widening the Door to Discretion: Reconsidering the 
“Margin of Appreciation” in a Time of Terror  
 
As shown in Section II, through the ―margin of 
appreciation‖ doctrine, the ECHR grants Member States a wide 
 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1263815&Site=CommDH&BackColorInter
net=FEC65B&BackColorIntranet=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679. 
238. See RUSSELL & HUNT, supra note 197, at 8-9 (alleging Section 21 of 
the Terrorist Act of 2006 extends governmental power to censorship of non-
violent political groups and views.). 
239. See BANISAR, supra note 20, app. at 39, ¶ 19. 
240. U.N. Human Rights Comm. [UNHRC], Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 (July 30, 
2008), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/433/42/PDF/G0843342.pdf?OpenElement. 
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degree of flexibility in complying with the Convention.  This 
flexibility is reflected in the ECtHR‘s pre-Madrid and London 
bombings‘ Article 10 jurisprudence.  In a post-London and 
Madrid world, one would expect that margin of appreciation to 
grow even wider in deference to heightened national security 
concerns.241  Although the ECtHR developed free speech 
jurisprudence prior to 9/11 that sought to balance national 
security concerns with free speech, one would expect that the 
unique characteristics of the threat posed by Islamic 
fundamentalist-inspired terrorism might provide the Court 
with the basis to privilege national security even further.  The 
diffuse nature of al-Qaeda‘s structure and the emergence of 
home-grown terrorists on European soil differentiate the threat 
posed by radical Islamic terrorism in comparison with domestic 
groups such as the Irish Republican Army (―IRA‖) and the 
ETA.242  A second critical difference stems from the frequency 
with which al-Qaeda inspired groups use suicide bombers.  The 
widespread resort to suicide bombings has increased the 
overall percentage of civilian casualties in contrast with the 
domestic terrorism that European states have experienced in 
the past.243  Finally, al-Qaeda‘s threat to use weapons of mass 
terror such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons 
categorically elevates the threat posed by terrorist groups 
inspired by Islamic fundamentalism.244 
The hypothesis that the ECtHR will expand the margin of 
appreciation granted to states in the aftermath of Madrid and 
London has so far been borne out by the Court‘s decision in 
Leroy v. France.245  In that 2008 decision, which has been 
 
241. Colm Campbell, Northern Ireland: Violent Conflict and the 
Resilience of International Law, in NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
DEMOCRACIES DEBATE COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 15, at 56, 71. 
242. Id. (arguing that al-Qaeda‘s diffuse structure poses a unique threat 
to Europe). 
243. Id. 
244. Graham Allison, Op-Ed., Nuclear Terrorism Poses the Gravest 
Threat Today, WALL ST. J. (Eur.), July 14, 2003, at A10, available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1271/nuclear_terrorism_poses
_the_gravest_threat_today.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2
Fop_ed%3Fgroupby%3D0%26filter%3D2003%26page%3D2. 
245. Leroy v. France, App. No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available 
at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=ht
ml&highlight=leroy%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20france%20%7C%2036109/03&
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condemned by human rights groups,246 the Court upheld the 
conviction of a French cartoonist who had penned and 
published an anti-American cartoon two days after the 
attacks.247  The facts of Leroy are starkly dissimilar to the way 
that incitement to terror is most commonly imagined in the 
modern age.  When asked to think of examples of speech that 
might incite terrorism, one might imagine an internet website 
that features videotaped images of actual terrorist attacks 
coupled with a call to join the jihad.  Against that backdrop, it 
is difficult to see how a French court convicted cartoonist Denis 
Leroy of complicity to incite terrorism for drawing a cartoon 
that was published in a weekly paper.  The cartoon portrayed 
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center with the 
caption ―We have all dreamt of it . . . . Hamas did it.‖248  
Published by the Basque weekly newspaper Ekaitza just two 
days after the attacks, the cartoon provoked an outpouring of 
critical letters and emails and led a French public prosecutor to 
file incitement charges against the cartoonist.249  Surprisingly, 
the prosecutor filed the charges even after the cartoonist 
publicly attempted to distance himself from more provocative 
interpretations of the cartoon.  One week after the cartoon‘s 
publication, the cartoonist explained that the purpose of the 
cartoon was not to glorify violence but rather to communicate 
his anti-Americanism through the use of satire and to 
underscore the decline of American imperialism.250  Both the 
French courts, as well as the ECtHR, concluded that the 
cartoon condoned and glorified terrorism.251  The Pau Court of 
Appeal explained its decision to uphold Leroy‘s conviction in 
 
sessionid=41876423&skin=hudoc-en. 
246. See Sandy Coliver, Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred vs. 
Freedom of Expression, HUM. RTS. ADVOC. (Human Rights Advocates, 
Berkeley, Cal.), Winter 2008-2009, at 5, 5-6, available at 
http://www.humanrightsadvocates.org/images/HRA_vol52.pdf (addressing 
Leroy v. France‘s overly broad application of UN Security Council resolution 
1624 to suppress legitimate speech). 
247. Leroy, App. No. 36109/03, at ¶¶ 5-8. 
248. Id. ¶ 6 (translated by author). 
249. Id. ¶¶ 4-10. 
250. Id. ¶ 27.  See also Dirk Voorhoof, European Court of Human Rights: 
Where is the ―Chilling Effect‖? 3 (May 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/ConfAntiTerrorism/ECHR_e
n.pdf. 
251. See Leroy, App. No. 36109/03, at ¶ 43. 
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this manner: 
 
[B]y making a direct allusion to the massive 
attacks on Manhattan, by attributing these 
attacks to a well-known terrorist organisation 
and by idealising this lethal project through the 
use of the verb ‗to dream‘, [the cartoonist] 
unequivocally prais[ed] an act of death . . . and 
justif[ied] the use of terrorism . . . [and] 
indirectly encourage[ed] the potential reader to 
evaluate positively the successful commission of 
a criminal act.252 
 
Although Leroy appealed his conviction to the ECtHR, the 
Court held that the prosecution was consistent with the 
purposes of Article 10, paragraph 2.253 
There has been some debate among commentators as to 
whether this decision signals a new direction in the Court‘s free 
speech jurisprudence.254  Scholars such as Georg Nolte 
maintain that the decision is a logical extension from prior 
jurisprudence.  Nolte has argued that because the Court has 
previously held that governments may place limits on media 
coverage of racist or right-wing activities, this decision does not 
represent a departure for the Court.255  Other scholars have not 
been so sanguine about the decision‘s impact, arguing that the 
 
252. Voorhoof, supra note 250, at 1 (quoting and translating the text of 
Leroy, App. No. 36109/03, at ¶ 42). 
253. See Leroy, App. No. 36109/03, at ¶ 44. 
254. See generally Voorhoof, supra note 250.  But see Peter Noorlander, 
Media Legal Def. Initiative, Address Before the Plenary Conference at the 
First Council of Europe Conference of Ministers Responsible for Media and 
New Communication Services (May 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.mediapolicy.org/peter-noorlander-on-media-and-terrorism-
reykjavik (alleging a growing trend among European governments to use 
anti-terrorism laws to curb free speech and media freedom); Dick Voorhoof, 
Reflections on Some Recent Restrictive Trends, Seminar on the European 
Protection of Freedom of Expression at the Court of Human Rights (Oct. 10, 
2008), available at http://www-ircm.u-
strasbg.fr/seminaire_oct2008/docs/Voorhoof_Final_conclusions.pdf 
(identifying a restrictive trend in case law governing the breadth of freedom 
of expression in Europe). 
255. Nolte, supra note 91, at 12-13 (identifying the logical extension of 
the historical role of European courts to restrict freedom of speech-a position 
which has been adopted by the European Court of Human Rights). 
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decision is part of a ―restrictive trend‖ in the Court‘s recent 
freedom of expression jurisprudence.256 
The decision in Leroy, however, is difficult to square with 
the ECtHR‘s decisions in numerous cases involving alleged 
state interference with the freedom of expression in Turkey.257  
To be sure, 9/11 represented a new type of terrorist attack that 
spawned a near crippling fear in western democracies in the 
weeks following the attacks.  It is also now clear that the 
United States Government deliberately manipulated 
intelligence, political imagery, and public fear for political 
gain.258  At the time of the 9/11 attacks, there was no evidence 
that France itself was an al-Qaeda target.  Moreover, since 
France was not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (―NATO‖) at the time of the attacks, NATO‘s 
subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty did 
not make France a target.259  Moreover, the opinion expressed 
in the cartoon coincided with French opinion: over seventy-five 
percent of French voters stated that they felt that ―U.S. foreign 
policy was . . . [partially] responsible for the rise of Islamic 
 
256. Voorhoof, supra note 254 (noting that the other contributions to the 
Seminar have shown this trend). 
257. See, e.g., Karataş v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 81. 
258. See AL GORE, THE ASSAULT ON REASON 23-24 (2007). 
259. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 
U.N.T.S. 243.  Article Five states: 
 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use 
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area. 
 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a 
result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security 
Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security. 
 
Id. 
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extremism.‖260 
In contrast, in cases such as Karatas v. Turkey261 and Zana 
v. Turkey,262 the Turkish Government had concrete reasons to 
fear that speech voiced in support of the PKK could incite 
further acts of violence by separatist forces within Turkey.  The 
PKK initiated a campaign of armed violence within Turkey 
beginning in 1984.  The threat that the PKK represented was 
not merely speculative.  For these reasons, it is difficult to 
explain why the Court condemned the actions of the Turkish 
Government in Karatas and Zana on Article 10 grounds while 
upholding the actions of France in Leroy, unless the Court‘s 
jurisprudence has taken a less restrictive turn. 
The ECtHR‘s decision in Leroy was followed by another 
troubling decision in which the Court refused to overturn the 
Turkish Government‘s decision to convict the owner and editor-
in-chief of a newspaper on charges of publishing the 
declarations of terrorist organizations.  In Saygili (No. 2) v. 
Turkey,263 the applicants alleged that the Turkish Security 
Court had violated Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention when 
the Court criminally punished the applicants for publishing 
statements by prisoners who opposed a new prison system in 
the newspaper Yeni Evrensel.264  In the statements, detainees 
who had been convicted or charged with supporting left-wing 
armed organizations threatened to commence a hunger strike 
and warned the government that they would refuse to enter 
newly constructed cells.265  Among their demands, the 
detainees had requested that the government abolish ―F‖ type 
prison cells, reinstate prisoners‘ rights, repeal the anti-
terrorism law, abolish state security courts, and file charges 
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against torturers and perpetrators of massacres.266  In a 5-2 
decision, the Court held that the state‘s action did not violate 
Article 10.267  The two dissenting judges stated: 
 
The majority considers that the message 
conveyed by the newspaper was ―not a peaceful 
one‖ and that it went beyond ―a mere criticism‖ of 
the new prison system (§28).  Such a 
consideration is disquieting.  ‗Watchdogs‘ are not 
meant to be peaceful puppies; their function is to 
bark and to disturb the appearance of peace 
whenever a menace threatens.  A new and, in our 
view, a dangerous threshold in the protection of 
free speech has been reached if expression may 
be suppressed, lawfully, because it is neither 
―peaceful‖ nor confined to ―mere criticism‖.  Such 
qualifications are new conditions precedent to 
the right to exercise such freedom and are not 
reflected in this Court‘s case law.268 
 
Despite the Court‘s decisions in those two cases, it has not 
yet adopted the expansive interpretation of incitement adopted 
by Turkish courts.  In another 2008 decision, Yalçin Küçük v. 
Turkey (No. 3), the ECtHR struck down a separate attempt by 
Turkey to punish a private citizen‘s political speech.269  In that 
case, Turkish prosecutors filed charges against a university 
professor and writer who had spoken and written frequently on 
the Kurdish question.270  In 1999, a Turkish court convicted the 
professor on charges of inciting hatred and hostility, publishing 
separatist propaganda, and belonging to and assisting an 
armed group.271  The factual basis for the charge of assisting an 
armed group was a television interview that the professor had 
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conducted with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, in which 
Küçük referred to Öcalan with the term ―Mister President.‖272  
In its decision, the Court reasoned that, although some of the 
statements made by Küçük were hostile in tone, only one of the 
statements advocated the use of violence, armed resistance, or 
uprising.273  While the Court found only one speech that 
contained a single sentence constituting an incitement to 
violence, the Court‘s finding condemned Küçük‘s conviction on 
necessity and proportionality grounds.274 
What conclusions can be drawn from Leroy and Saygili 
with respect to the ECtHR‘s post-London direction?  First, 
because of the complexity of the Court‘s analysis, it may be too 
early to determine whether the Court has indeed altered its 
course.  The balancing analysis that the Court engages in to 
determine whether states may limit freedom of expression to 
prevent terrorism is complex.275  Restrictions on free expression 
in the name of national security or public order must still 
satisfy the aforementioned tests of legality, necessity, and 
proportionality.  Second, the Court enjoys substantial 
discretion when it interprets whether or not there is a link 
between speech and harm.  For instance, in its decision in 
Leroy v. France, the Court based its decision on its own 
determination that the cartoon could lead the viewer to 
determine that the 9/11 attacks were justifiable acts.  The 
Court reached this determination despite the fact that it is 
unclear whether the cartoonist himself intended that this post-
attack questioning of United States policies would directly lead 
to further terrorist attacks.  Moreover, the Court‘s analysis did 
not hinge on the cartoonist‘s intent to incite, but rather its own 
post-event speculation of the potential impact of the cartoon.  
The purpose of this speculation was merely to determine 
whether the actions taken by the French Government against 
the cartoonist were both necessary and proportionate.  Because 
the Court allows each state a margin of appreciation based on 
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its domestic circumstances as well as its own unique legal and 
cultural history, the Court grants states wide latitude when it 
determines what is necessary and proportionate.  In the 
aftermath of 9/11, France‘s large Muslim population and past 
history of domestic terrorism may have been sufficient to sway 
the Court. 
In Saygili (No. 2), the ECtHR again rested its holding on 
its assessment of the speech‘s potential impact.  The judges 
presumed that the publication of the inmate‘s letters was 
capable of inflaming discontent within the prison system.  The 
majority stated: 
 
[T]he problem results from the wording of the 
overall message given to the readers, where their 
authors state that they will rather die than enter 
the cells and call on others to take action in order 
to support their general resistance and not to 
content themselves with mere declarations.  It is 
clear that the message given is not a peaceful one 
and cannot be seen as a mere criticism of the new 
prison system.  While it is true that the 
applicants did not personally associate 
themselves with the views contained in these 
declarations, they nevertheless provided their 
writers, who expressed their affiliation to illegal 
armed groups, with an outlet to stir up violence 
and hatred.  Accordingly, the content of these 
declarations must be seen as capable of inciting 
violence in the prisons by instilling an irrational 
reaction against those who introduced or were in 
charge of the new incarceration system.276 
 
When the ECtHR‘s analysis of necessity rests on its 
evaluation of possible incitement, tenuous causality between 
speech and harm, or unclear intent, the danger exists that the 
Court will open a wide door permitting broad state action to 
 
276. Saygili v. Turkey (No. 2), App. No. 38991/02, ¶ 28, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2009), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=847384
&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649. 
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/17
2010] FREE SPEECH . . . EUROPEAN SECURITY 477 
proscribe speech.  What is especially troubling about these two 
cases is that the Court upheld government restrictions on the 
press, the institution that plays a critical role in informing the 
public and sparking debate.  In Saygili (No. 2), the state 
convicted the publisher and owner of the newspaper who had 
merely published the letters and not written them.  To 
determine whether it was necessary for the government to 
impose a restriction to satisfy a pressing social need, the Court 
based its analysis on the existence of a ―possible‖ social need 
rather than a pressing one.277  Moreover, the Court‘s decision in 
Leroy runs against its conclusion in Handyside v. United 
Kingdom.278  In Handyside, the Court held that even in a 
context of political violence, Article 10 protects ideas that may 
―offend, shock or disturb the State or any section of the 
population.‖279  A strong argument can be made that the 
cartoon in Leroy fell into the category of offensive speech that 
the Court previously protected in Handyside. 
Still, the decisions in Leroy and Saygili (No. 2) do not by 
themselves show that the ECtHR has abandoned its 
commitment to protecting speech.  Notably, the Court‘s 
decision in Saygili (No. 2) does not seem to indicate that the 
European judges have grown more accommodating of Turkey‘s 
repeated attempts to restrict speech under the guise of 
protecting public order.  Recent decisions of the Court have 
struck down Turkish restrictions in several cases.  In these 
cases Turkey attempted to proscribe speech that included 
references to the Kurdish independence movement or actions of 
the PKK,280 criticisms of the military,281 non-violent political 
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appeals,282 and interviews with PKK members,283 as 
incitement-related speech that justified government 
interference.  In comparing the ECtHR‘s decisions in Leroy and 
Saygili (No. 2) to this string of cases in which the Court found 
Article 10 violations, the 2008 Turkish cases appear to set the 
boundaries beyond which the Court has concluded that the link 
between speech and potential incitement is too attenuated and 
indirect.284  For example, in İsak Tepe v. Turkey, Turkey 
indicted an individual on charges of making separatist 
propaganda after he delivered speeches in which he referred to 
―the heroes in the mountain‖ and ―the liberation of a nation.‖285  
The Court condemned Turkey‘s actions and reasoned that 
statements made by the applicant did not, by themselves, incite 
violence.286  Additionally, the Court found several grounds to 
condemn Turkey‘s restrictions on Article 10 in Kanat v. 
Turkey.287  In that case, a Turkish court convicted the editor 
and owners of the monthly magazine, Voice of the Free Woman, 
on the charge of publishing a statement by a leader of an illegal 
organization.288  In the published statement, the PKK leader 
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argued that steps should be taken to improve the education of 
women.289  The Court held that, standing alone, the fact that a 
member of an illegal organization had made statements did not 
justify the government‘s interference with the newspaper‘s 
right to freedom of expression, since the statements did not 
incite recourse to violence, armed resistance or insurrection.290  
Moreover, the Court found that because the applicants‘ 
convictions had been disproportionate to the aims pursued, 
their prosecutions were not ―necessary in a democratic 
society.‖291 
Taken as a whole, the ECtHR‘s recent jurisprudence does 
not suggest that the Court has radically altered the shape of its 
Article 10 reasoning process in the post-Framework era.  The 
Court‘s analysis continues to be bound by a common core of 
basic principles.  State interference on speech must be justified 
by a pressing social need, as well as be both necessary and 
proportionate.  How the Court elects to apply those principles 
to a particular case depends on its analysis of the unique facts 
of each case.  In some sense, the weakness in the Court‘s ability 
to protect free speech stems from the Court‘s own weak 
position: it can only guide state decision-making within the 
rather wide boundaries set by the margin of the appreciation 
doctrine.  The weakness of the Court‘s position is underscored 
by the ongoing number of petitions that the Court fields from 
Turkish citizens.  Despite the plethora of Court opinions that 
fail to uphold Turkey‘s attempts to sanction speech, the Court‘s 
decisions as a whole appear to have had little effect in 
moderating Turkey‘s ongoing attempts to circumscribe speech 
on the Kurdish question. 
Moreover, the ECtHR possesses wide discretion to discern 
that speech possesses the potential to incite violence.  From an 
American perspective, it appears that the Court strains to find 
a potential link to possible violence.  However, Europe‘s 
commitment to the government‘s affirmative role in protecting 
communitarian values and human dignity suggests a different 
interpretation.  Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that 
the Court is extremely sensitive to the potential that speech 
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possesses to roil the community and to undermine human 
dignity. 
 
IV. Conclusion: Law, Terrorism, and the Changing Nature of 
Democratic States 
 
 The attacks on London and Madrid rocked Europe.  The 
presence of ―home grown‖ terrorists led policymakers to take 
aggressive steps to implement a prevention-oriented 
counterterrorism policy, one focus of which was to interrupt the 
radicalization process.  The Council of Europe‘s 2008 
Amendment to the Framework Decision, which instructed 
states to implement anti-incitement legislation, is evidence of 
this shift. 
One would expect that the enactment of this legislation 
would signal a shift in how Member States balance the values 
of protecting national security and preserving public order with 
the right to freedom of expression.  At first glance, the 
reasoning behind such laws is understandable.  Having 
recovered from the initial shock of damage caused by radical 
Islamic terrorism, governments throughout Europe have 
shifted counterterrorism strategies in the direction of 
prevention.  In order to stop terrorists before they cause 
civilian casualties, law enforcement must interrupt attack-
planning and recruitment.  Some percentage of individuals who 
hear the terrorists‘ messages will someday engage in violent 
action. 
However, the direction of the Framework Decision and 
subsequent state legislation is problematic.  In an effort to 
broadly target speech that may lead to incitement, many states 
have implemented legislation that does not require that the 
link between speech and incitement be direct.  In some states, 
the individual responsible for the speech need not have actually 
intended to incite violence.  In these cases, this legislation has 
awarded prosecutors and magistrates the power to criminally 
sanction speech that has little chance of inciting violence.  
Moreover, the legislation‘s efficacy in stopping recruitment is 
questionable.  The research cited in this article indicates that 
there are many paths to becoming a terrorist.  As a result, the 
Framework Amendment has propelled states to waste scarce 
legal and prosecutorial resources as they attempt to go after 
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speech, rather than action.  Where governments use their new-
found power to prosecute individuals already on the societal 
periphery, they may do more harm than good.  Publicity 
generated by such prosecutions may destroy civic goodwill in 
certain segments of the population who will view the cases 
through a lens of political and religious persecution. 
While magistrates and prosecutors appear to have 
endorsed the anti-incitement and glorification legislation shift 
by instigating investigations and prosecutions under these 
provisions, that shift has been somewhat tempered by the 
decisions of national courts.  Still, the expanded scope of 
government action, such as the use of anti-incitement 
legislation to deport non-citizens in France, proceeds 
unaffected by judicial review.  Moreover, individuals caught in 
the net of these provisions require time and resources to fight 
back. 
While some commentators have suggested that the ECtHR 
has shifted direction in the past decade towards upholding 
more state intrusions on speech, it is difficult to determine that 
such a premise is true.  The critical doctrinal features of the 
Court‘s Article 10 jurisprudence, namely the requirement that 
the restriction serve a pressing social need as well as be both 
necessary and proportionate, were in place before the 
Amendment‘s adoption.  Moreover, the Court‘s jurisprudence in 
effect merely sets the outer boundaries of that balance.  Under 
the margin of appreciation doctrine, states have the power to 
fine tune the balance between security and free speech in 
accord with their own unique legal and cultural histories.  
When compared to the United States Supreme Court, the 
ECtHR has far less power to set the boundaries of freedom of 
expression.  As Elisabeth Zoller has noted, while the Supreme 
Court grants American states almost no margin of judgment, 
the ECtHR lacks the same degree of control over European 
states.292  There is no definitive European standard that 
defines the scope of freedom of expression; instead a plethora of 
national definitions exist.  Those standards must fall within 
the wide boundaries set by Strasbourg.  With robust power, the 
Supreme Court has rigorously defended freedom of expression 
 
292. Elisabeth Zoller, Freedom of Expression: “Precious Right” in Europe, 
“Sacred Right” in the United States?, 84 IND. L.J. 803, 807 (2009). 
65
482 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
in the United States by imposing what Zoller has described as 
―categorical and rigid rules.‖293 
The history of free speech protections in Europe is far 
different than the direction taken by the United States in the 
past four decades.  There are wide variations in those 
traditions throughout Europe.  Until the passage of the Human 
Rights Act of 1998, for example, England took little notice of 
freedom of expression.294  While the Act raised public 
consciousness as well as established the British court‘s 
obligations to protect the freedom of expression, that 
consciousness is also seared by the imprint of the London 
bombings.  More importantly, the high value that European 
jurisprudence places on human dignity necessarily prevents 
free speech from assuming a privileged constitutional position.  
The barbarous actions taken by Germany‘s Nazi regime 
spurred Europe‘s post-war governments to take aggressive 
action targeting hate speech.  These actions in many ways 
paved the way for the current round of anti-incitement and 
glorification of terrorism legislation. 
Although the ECtHR has underscored the importance of 
the free flow of information in a democratic society, the 
preeminent role accorded to human dignity created a doctrinal 
legacy that severely tempered that flow of information.  The 
high value that some European states place on promoting the 
dignity of the community places limits on the content of civil 
discourse that many Americans would be unwilling to tolerate.  
Still, that same communitarianism may open the door to 
government action in the name of counterterrorism policy that 
may pose a threat to democratic governance. 
The degree to which a society tolerates anti-democratic 
speech may reflect the government‘s confidence in the health of 
the democracy.  Governments throughout Europe are 
confronting dilemmas posed by the increasing diversity of 
Europe‘s population.  States such as Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom are home to large unintegrated Muslim 
communities, which challenge the notion of an integrated 
national community itself.  As European states make 
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judgements about what speech is acceptable in an age of terror, 
lurking in the background is the question, acceptable to whom?  
As courts make judgments about the potential that particular 
speech has to incite violence, those determinations run the risk 
of protecting the majority‘s vision and criminalizing the views 
of minority populations.  Viewed in this light, it is possible that 
European states will use these new anti-incitement and 
glorification provisions to censor certain political viewpoints in 
an attempt to preserve traditional visions of homogenous 
European states.  By placing these powerful tools in the hands 
of the state, legislatures and citizens run the risk that 
prosecutors see the danger of terrorism everywhere and will 
seek to over-broadly regulate speech and undermine 
democratic discourse.  In an era in which governments can so 
easily manipulate each terrorist attack to stoke public fears 
and justify the further aggrandizement of state power, the risk 
that these statutes pose to democratic governance may be too 
high given the fact that the efficacy of the provisions is 
questionable. 
While the emergence of home-grown terrorism on 
European soil constitutes a real threat to European security, 
Europe‘s recent steps further privilege security over speech.  
Due to their overbreadth, they constitute an equally serious 
threat to democratic governance.  The steps that Europe has 
taken to regulate speech lowers the burdens placed on 
governments to justify those restrictions so drastically that 
they raise the spectre that governments will use the 
regulations to merely target speech that is offensive.  The 
constitutional struggle to find the proper balance between 
endowing governments with sufficient power to protect citizens 
and protecting civil liberties is an ongoing one that reflects a 
political community‘s self-understanding.295  The contours of 
those policies, particularly how they protect security and 
human rights, define the foundations of the democratic state.  
As Europe struggles to protect itself from terrorism, it is 
equally important that Europe pay attention to the norms of 
democratic debate itself. 
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